THE

# MODERN CHURCHMAN

*By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—Erasmus.*

*A State without the means of change is without the means of conservation.—Edmund Burke.*

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## AUTHORITY IN RELIGION[1]

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THE field of controversy between Protestant and Catholic Christians is a very wide and variegated one: but it is encouraging as well as instructive to bear in mind that that field is neighboured by a large area of agreement—the common possession of the Christian name, the confession of the same Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour, the reverence for the Scriptures as containing the Word of God, the avowal and pursuit of the Christian ethic, the practice of public and private worship, and the belief in a future life. Over and above all these, we note with joy the growing readiness on either side to acknowledge the other's sincerity and to respect the other's conscientious convictions, even where these differ on points regarded as essential. And we can observe too a trust in the value of reasoning as a means of demonstrating the truth. There is much to be gained, therefore, by a frank and dispassionate explanation of our differences. As Dr. Edwyn Bevan wrote in *The Hibbert Journal* a little time ago:

> 'The idea that vigorous controversy is incompatible with Christian charity, though common in the secular Press, is of course to be repudiated' (January 1933, p. 186).

[1] A paper read at the Nicene Society, Oxford, on May 29th, 1934.

While friendly discussion is useful for *all* parts of the field of controversy, it is likely to be most valuable if applied to the most strategic or fundamental questions: and of these, it can hardly be doubted that the problem of authority is the first. I propose therefore to discuss 'Authority in Religion.' We shall not need to worry about the distinction usually drawn between Authority for Faith and Authority for Morals: for our purpose we can regard these two compartments as coincident. 'Faith' (in this connexion at least) means the acceptance by the mind of certain religious doctrines: but the acceptance of true doctrines and the rejection of untrue doctrines is itself a moral duty, and faith therefore can be regarded as included in morality. Morals, on the other hand, rest upon beliefs as to the Nature and Will of God, that is, upon religious doctrines, and as such can be treated as implicates of faith.

I begin therefore with a definition which I hope will find agreement: Authority (for our purpose) is a standard with which we *ought* to comply. Not every standard that men do comply with ought to be complied with: the moral rightness of complying is essential to every true authority. Nor shall we disagree over my next postulate—in religion the ultimate authority is God. Some philosophers have argued that it is incorrect to consider a thing to be right just because God wills it: but I pass this objection by, partly because I doubt whether anyone in the present company feels it, partly because I think it arises from a too narrow and anthropomorphic view of God, and partly because in any case it does not apply to *intellectual* beliefs (which have to be accommodated to reality as we find it).

But our learning of God has to be carried on under conditions and through media; and it is over these conditions and media that our convictions begin to diverge. In order to vindicate what I understand to be the essential Protestant position in regard to them, I appeal to the analogy of ordinary scientific study, with the general method of which we are all familiar.

Perhaps I ought first to say a word as to my right to adduce this analogy, in view of various important differences between religion and science. It will perhaps be said that, inasmuch as religion involves the important factors of revelation and faith (the word 'faith' being here used in the sense of religious trust,

not of intellectual affirmation), the analogy is bound to break down. I would contend, however, that the analogy is perfectly sound. For (*a*) the intelligence wherewith we discern the deep things of God is the same intelligence as that by means of which we investigate the physical universe, albeit it is handling very different matters in the two cases : it observes the same rational laws, and has to yield to objective reality the same docile obedience. (*b*) If it be argued that religious faith puts the quest for truth in a totally unique category, I would reply that, in the matter of needing faith, the scientist is in precisely the same boat as the religious seeker. The religious seeker starts with a faith in God which is provable in experience, but is not (as I shall argue presently) provable by syllogistic logic. In the same way the scientist has to start by assuming the existence and knowability of the physical universe, and the reliability of man's powers of observation and of reasoning : these assumptions can be justified by after-experience; but they cannot be demonstrated in advance — rather are they themselves the necessary pre-requisites of all scientific demonstration. Faith is needed in both cases : the need of it in religious enquiry does not therefore impair the analogy between theology and science. (*c*) It will perhaps be pleaded that we have a Divine revelation in one case, and unaided human reason in the other; and that this makes the two so dissimilar that it is impossible to argue from one to the other. But observe. The claim made on behalf of a true Divine revelation comes before man in company with claims made on behalf of imaginary revelations. Thus, Divine authority is claimed, for example, for the Koran and the Vedic Scriptures and even Mormon documents, just as it is for the Bible. Whether he likes it or not, therefore, man must needs decide somehow which of the various claimants is genuine. How is he to do this? It is clearly not enough that many persons tell him that a given claim is genuine : for that is simply a repetition, not a vindication, of the claim. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the claim advocated by a numerical majority of supporters is necessarily justified. The answer surely is that the claim must be subjected to the scrutiny of the human mind and conscience and tested out in human experience. Here again therefore we see that the great difference in subject-matter does

not invalidate the analogy between theology and science. I should even be disposed to claim that the relation between them is more than an analogy, that it is a close parallel rather.

I proceed therefore to an analysis of the method by which in science truth is, and ought to be, attained. Let us suppose that we have before us, not a young child learning his alphabet—for he is not yet a complete person, and it is a complete and responsible person we need as our analogue of the intelligent Catholic or Protestant—but a grown-up and open-eyed student of astronomy. What are the conditions under which he learns the truth about the stars?

(1) *He has to begin by exercising his faith.* He must take on trust the existence and knowability of the stellar universe and the reliability of careful human observation and reasoning. These assumptions are axiomatic: without them he cannot even begin to learn.

(2) As the best means of learning about the stars, he makes it his practice not only to observe them himself, but to listen to, and to read, the words of men who (through long study before he entered the field) know far more about the stars than he does. This *need of authorities in the form of teachers* is general over the whole field of human knowledge: though in certain fields (notably mathematics) gifted individuals have been known to make astonishing headway by relying exclusively on their own unaided powers. But, broadly speaking, every learner needs for his guidance, not only his field of study, but an experienced teacher also.

(3) *His selection of a teacher in his own autonomous act.* I wish to emphasize the autonomy of the choice, because it is frequently lost sight of behind the learner's initial ignorance of his subject and his obvious need of a teacher. Unlike the infant who, in but partial possession of his personality, can exercise virtually no choice, but has perforce to listen to whatever is said to him, the responsible student, however ignorant of the subject he may be, selects his own teacher, and begins to learn from him only when satisfied that he (the teacher) is in all probability able to teach him aright. This is still the case even when he does not of himself know anything regarding reliable

teachers: he then makes his choice on the advice of someone whom he believes to be able to tell him; but even so he has first to satisfy himself that this informant is probably able and willing to advise him rightly. Every intelligent learner, therefore, chooses his own teacher before trusting him.

(4) *No such human teacher is, in any department of knowledge, ever rightly regarded as infallible.* By infallible I mean unconditionally trustworthy. A teacher may in point of fact be inerrant, that is, found by testing to have made no mistake. But he is never assumed in advance to be incapable of making a mistake. If he has good credentials, his pupils — like sensible fellows — will impose in his teaching a large measure of trust: but the trust, strictly regarded, is always provisional. His teaching is accepted in the last resort, not because it is he who gives it, but because his students believe that it has been arrived at by the sanctified methods of investigation, and could, if time permitted, be verified by themselves. A capable teacher expects an elementary student to take his word for it as the normal thing: but no wise teacher asks to be regarded as unconditionally accurate, that is, as infallible, or denies his pupils' potential right and ultimate ability to put every piece of his teaching to the test by their own investigation.

(5) It follows from this that every pupil, in proportion as he grows in the knowledge of his subject, *acquires the right to differ from his teacher* if he finds that the teacher's word fails to pass the verifying test. The most obvious manifestation of this right is the student's privilege (which few would deny him) of spotting and correcting misprints, even in his most authoritative text-book. But a man who is entitled and able to correct misprints in his text-book, is also entitled to take notice when two equally eminent authorities differ from one another, and he has to decide which he will regard as mistaken. He has therefore to face the possibility that, however trustworthy for practical purposes his teacher is, that teacher may, on any particular point, be in error.

(6) In other words, *ultimate and infallible authority never resides in the human teacher, but only in the facts under examination* — that portion of reality concerning which the truth

is being sought. Those facts, whatever they be, are entitled to control the truth-seeker's opinions concerning them: his business is at all costs to bring his beliefs into close correspondence with them. Thus, for the astronomer, the ultimate and only infallible authority is the stellar universe itself: for the botanist, it is the plant-world: for the mathematician, the nature of space and number: for the historian, the facts as they actually were: for the philosopher, reality as it exists.

(7) *The student may be led into error*, not only by trusting to the erroneous utterance of some normally accurate teacher, but also by the intellectual limitations involved in his own intangible and unmanageable personal factor. *For the correction of these errors he depends*, not upon some supposedly infallible teacher, proclaimed as the necessary or convenient umpire for settling all cases in dispute, but *upon the objective facts under investigation* to which appeal can again and again be made, and against which all opinions and conclusions have to be tested. Science makes no use whatever of infallible scientists: the world which it continues to study is the sufficient safeguard against permanent or fatal error.

It now remains for me to draw out the seven corresponding facts in the realm of religious truth.

(1) *The learner's axioms.* The seeker has to begin by having faith in God. 'He who comes to God must believe that He exists and that He is a rewarder of those that seek Him out.' I suppose we shall go on arguing to the end of time whether there is any proof of God's existence. I wish to observe only that it seems to me erroneous to regard proof and certainty as co-extensive. I am, for example, certain that I exist, that two and two make four, that I am reading a paper of my own composition on 'Authority in Religion,' and that I love my friends: but my certainty of these things is of the intuitive, not of the logical order. The proofs I could give of them would not be logical proofs: if there be proofs at all, they would be of the sort referred to in the proverb, 'The proof of the pudding is in the eating.' Logical proof, on the other hand, is of two sorts: (1) deductive (or syllogistic), and (2) inductive (proceeding by hypothesis and test). Syllogistic logic can give you certainty; but the certainty depends on conditions, namely, the truth of

the premises. As there are no premises so great that you can syllogistically deduce from them the existence of an infinite and perfect Being, there can apparently be no deductive proof of the existence of God. You may have what is called an inductive proof, as when thinkers infer God's existence from the works of Nature, etc. But I doubt whether a purely inductive argument can be said to lead to certainty in the strict sense: and if it does not, then it follows that there is no *logical* certainty of God's existence. There remains what I have called intuitive certainty; and I incline to regard our faith in God as of that order, analogous to the scientist's axioms of the existence and knowability of the natural world, and the reliability of his own scientific method.

(2) *The need of teachers.* The seeker after God needs the guidance of experienced and authoritative teachers. In the broad sense the whole religious experience of the race is his teacher. But we may reduce it to more manageable proportions by concentrating on the Bible and the Church. In the Old Testament we are taught by the inspired prophets of Israel, that nation gifted with a unique vision of God; in the New, by the recorded life and teaching of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word of God, and by the teaching of His early disciples; in the story of the Church, we put ourselves to school with the Christian saints, and seek to learn of God from their creeds, their theology, their worship, and their example. The authority of the Bible, of Jesus Christ, and of the Church with her Creeds, is acknowledged by Catholics and Protestants alike.

(3) *The choice of teachers by private judgment.* But Scripture and Church-teaching are both wide fields; and as their contents are by no means uniform, the seeker soon realizes that he has got to make his choice between their various parts. Even though he may decline to reject definitely any part of either, yet he has got to prefer some parts to others: he has to choose, that is to say, those parts in the light of which he will interpret the rest. In a word, he has, like the scientific student, to choose his teachers. And choose them he does, whatever ecclesiastical group he belongs to: and what is more, he chooses them by means of an act of private judgment. It cannot be too emphatically pointed out to our Catholic friends, that their customary

depreciation of trust in private judgment, as the characteristic blemish of Protestantism, is totally inconsistent with their own trust in the infallibility of the Pope (or, in the case of Anglo-Catholics, the infallibility of certain creeds). For if that trust be not at bottom an act of private judgment, what, I ask, is it? A decision to follow the leading of this authority rather than that is fully as much an act of private judgment as is a decision to follow none. Protestant private judgment is a following of authorities as truly as is the Catholic's submission to the voice of the Church. The Catholic submission to the voice of the Church rests upon private judgment as truly as does the Protestant's trust in the Reformation. What disguises the fact for Catholics is that, when once the great act of choice has been made, private judgment confines itself to purely subordinate issues, for the authority which the individual has selected settles all major issues itself. But as regards the initial choice, made by private judgment, there is not a pin's head to choose between the Catholic and the Protestant method. It is a case of six of the one, and exactly and precisely half a dozen of the other.

(4) *No teacher infallible.* The quest for truth in other fields leads us to expect that in religion also the authorities will not be infallible, *i.e.* unconditionally inerrant, immune from all need of test. Indeed, the choice by private judgment of one authority among many presupposes the need of testing, and thus seems inconsistent with the declaration that the authority chosen is trustworthy unconditionally. If the teaching of an authority in religion is accepted, the basic reason for which it is accepted is not that such and such an authority gave it, but that what he gave was arrived at by genuine insight into reality, and is therefore at least *potentially* verifiable by those who accept it. That is, their acceptance is, strictly speaking, provisional, though in many cases what is accepted is, for practical reasons, not actually verified by him who accepts it. While, however, I can see no more need or possibility of infallible authority in religion than in science or history, I desire to point out, what perhaps ought not to need pointing out, that the denial of infallibility is perfectly compatible with a humble and docile reverence for authorities, and if anyone doubts it, let him examine the mind of any intelligent and note-taking student in any lecture-room in

Oxford to-morrow morning. Too often has the Protestant repudiation of infallibility been for controversial purposes misrepresented as a free-lance claim to learn from nobody. It is nothing of the sort, and, as I say, our lecture-rooms are a proof of the shallowness of the argument.

(5) *The right to disagree with one's teacher.* If a teacher be not infallible, his pupil possesses a growing right to disagree with him if his words on any point fail to pass the verifying test. The possession of this right is a commonplace in every field of human enquiry except the realm of Catholic dogma. Without it the advance of truth in science, history, and philosophy would be impossible. Herein is the Protestant's right to differ, not only from the Pope, but from Luther and Calvin also. How, without this right to discern between the true and the false, the right and the wrong, can there be any profitable study of the complex manifold of Scripture? Catholic apologetic denies the right of the individual to pit his own opinion, however carefully founded on a study of authorities, against the considered judgment of the Church; but it betrays at several points its awareness of the need of departing from the judgment of the Church on certain discreet occasions.

Thus (*a*) the Pope was declared in 1870 to be infallible whenever 'he speaks *ex cathedra*, that is, when, in the performance of his function as pastor and teacher of all Christians, he defines by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the whole Church.' The natural meaning of the words is not really open to question: they ought to cover all rulings promulgated by the Pope in his official capacity. Every authoritative epistle, bull, or encyclical, dealing with a question of faith or morals, and issued by the Pope to the faithful, comes naturally within the terms of this definition of *ex-cathedra* utterances. Practical Catholic piety conforms to this view, involving as it does obedience to *all* papal instructions. Such obedience, and not obedience to dogmatic decisions only, was demanded by Pius IX in 1870 under penalty of anathema, and again by Leo XIII in 1890. This would mean that Catholics for all time must assent to the official utterance of Pope Honorius I about 635 A.D. that there was only one will in Jesus Christ, not two; to the solemn declaration of Eugenius IV in 1441 that

all pagans, Jews, heretics, and schismatics would go into the eternal fire; to Leo X's condemnation in 1520 of Luther's opinion that it was against the will of the Spirit that heretics should be burnt; and to Pius IX's repudiation in 1864 of the view that Catholicism should no longer be the only religion tolerated by the State, that non-Catholic immigrants into Catholic regions should be allowed freedom of public worship, and that the Pope ought to come to terms (*sese reconciliare et componere*) with progress, liberalism, and present-day culture (*recenti civilitate*). All these, being official decisions issued by the Pope in his capacity as head of the Church, ought to be regarded as *ex-cathedra* utterances; yet most enlightened Catholics regard them all as erroneous. How then can they save themselves from infringing the 1870 decree? They save themselves by keeping the precise meaning of *ex-cathedra* unsettled, so that it is possible, while some theologians contend that *all* official papal decisions are *ex-cathedra*, for others to argue that never yet in the history of the Church has even a single *ex-cathedra* decision been given. In 1871 Pius IX was begged to lay down more precisely what the 1870 definition really meant: he declined to do so, on the ground that it was sufficiently clear as it was. But whatever view be taken of this indefiniteness of the meaning of *ex-cathedra*, the facts just referred to reveal the Catholic awareness of the need of occasionally regarding the Pope as mistaken.

(*b*) Catholic lawyers have been asked what would result if at any time it should happen that a Pope officially sanctioned a clearly heretical doctrine. The case is not entirely imaginary, for one arguable view is that what Honorius I did in 635 was to pronounce a clearly heretical view to be orthodox: moreover, from 1378 to 1415, the Church's allegiance was divided between two series of Popes, one of which at least has been in the gravest possible error. The lawyers' answer to the question is that any Pope issuing an heretical doctrine *ex-cathedra* would *ipso facto* have ceased to be Pope. The answer seems to save the situation by denying the heretical statement to be a papal utterance at all: but it at the same time reveals a capacity in the Pope's subjects to differ from their supposedly infallible teacher.

(*c*) The Catholic denial of the individual Christian's right to differ from the Pope and the Church, is inconsistent with the

appeal so often made to the plain man to consider the Catholic case on its own merits and to make an unbiassed judgment regarding it. For if I as a plain man have what the Catholic apologist assumes me to have, namely, sufficient intelligence to follow his arguments, to weigh them up against objections, and to decide according to their validity, then it follows *eo ipso* that I have sufficient intelligence to see that the dogma of 1870 (which insists that belief in papal infallibility has always been an item in the Church's faith) is inconsistent with recorded history. And *vice versa*, if my private judgment is such a poor instrument that it gives me no right to hold that the dogma of 1870 is falsified by history, what is the use of the Catholic apologist appealing to my private judgment for a favourable verdict on his general argument?

I therefore conclude under this heading that Catholics do, in certain directions, acknowledge the individual's right and power to differ from the instructions laid down by the Church: and I submit that these acknowledgments are inconsistent with, and indeed disprove, the existence of infallibility in either Church or Pope.

(6) *God the only infallible authority*. The ultimate and infallible authority for the Christian therefore does not reside in Pope or Church or Creed or Bible, though all these may rightly be regarded as his 'authorities': it resides only in God Himself, in His Nature and work as constituting the real universe, and in His Will as constituting the supreme moral law. What the stars are for the astronomer, the plants for the botanist, space and number for the mathematician, past events for the historian, God's Nature and Will are for the Christian thinker, namely, the great standards to which without appeal his thoughts and conduct ought to conform, the sole authority which can be accurately described as truly ultimate and truly infallible.

(7) *God and reality the sufficient correctives of error*. Support for the Catholic view of ecclesiastical or papal infallibility is often sought on pragmatic grounds. Man surely needs, it is said, an infallible human interpreter of the Divine revelation given in Scripture: and the plea is reinforced by pointing to the manifold errors into which private judgment frequently leads those who follow it. The argument, I submit, is wholly inconclusive.

To say that God *must* have provided an infallible human interpreter is a purely arbitrary assertion. The provision made by God for man's safety, welfare, and enlightenment in other directions, strongly discourages the idea that absolute safeguards in religion or elsewhere are a part of His providential policy. As for the multitude of errors committed by Protestants, a study of Church history clearly shows that Protestants have had no monopoly of error. The Church (as viewed by Catholics) was in error in the first century in expecting the early and visible return of Christ to earth; she was in error in encouraging the torture, slaughter, and burning of heretics in the Middle Ages; she was in error in condemning Galileo; she was (as most Catholics now think) in error in pronouncing interest on loans immoral; she has frequently been in error in her interpretation of Scripture. It is customary to parry this observation by saying that the Church has at least been a truthworthy guide in the great underlying principles of the Christian ethic; but in this matter, man needs no infallible guide; his conscience and commonsense are sufficient. If guidance is needed anywhere, it is in the practical application of these principles; and this is just where the Church has often gone astray. A comparison between the best and most representative Protestant teaching and official Catholic teaching, or a comparison between the average morality of a Catholic population and the average morality of a Protestant population, would show that neither side has any monopoly of true moral insight.

Moreover, to adduce the prevalence and harmfulness of error as a reason for positing some infallible external human authority is a step that would be at once disallowed as arbitrary in any other branch of human enquiry. There are, for instance, certain misguided people about who believe that the earth is flat. How should we deal with them? Not by facing them up with some supposedly infallible human teacher, but by showing them the physical facts again, and leaving the facts to make their own impression. If we fail to convince these people, we do not worry about it or persecute them: we let them go their own way, confident that real truth and the human mind are so akin that ultimately, if thought be left free, the mind will come to the truth. And just as in the last resort the astronomer, for the cor-

rection of his errors, does not go to an infallible human teacher, but goes again with his intelligence to the stars, so too in the last resort the Christian, for the correction of *his* errors, has to take his reason and conscience to God — to God as manifested in the realm of reality and moral value, which He has created, and with which (through reason and conscience) men are in immediate experiential touch. If we seriously mean our profession of faith in the indwelling in man of God's Spirit of Truth, we shall see in this Divine Presence in reason and conscience, and in the world of reality and value to and through which it guides us, an amply sufficient corrective of all error, an amply sufficient safeguard against all danger.

Perhaps before I close, I ought to add a paragraph in order to answer by anticipation the question: How does the theory I have advocated affect our view of the personal authority of Jesus Christ? I would reply tentatively as follows:

In so far as we think of our Lord's Person and Work as a Divine *revelation*, we have come to think of them as such, not by shutting our eyes and accepting whatever was put before us, but by weighing His claims reverently, conscientiously, and intelligently, against the other 'gods many and lords many,' who also have claimed to bring or to be Divine revelations. The acknowledgment of an objective Divine revelation is not inconsistent with, nay rather, it is dependent upon, the exercise of human scrutiny.

In so far as the Church's doctrine of His Person is *a philosophical construction* achieved by the Church's thinkers, rather than a revelation made by man to God, it has to be dealt with as all elaborated doctrines have to be dealt with, namely, by being continually re-examined and tested in the light of all that man has learned to know about the Divine Nature and the ways of God with man.

In so far as our Lord's life is known to us primarily through *the Gospel-records*, these records need to be scrutinized, compared, sifted and interpreted by all the best methods which historical study in other fields has taught us. To argue (as Catholic writers sometimes do) that, because we need or think we need a perfectly inerrant record of our Saviour's words, therefore the

Gospel-record of his words *is* inerrant, is clearly to put the cart before the horse. Only by untrammelled historical criticism can we distinguish between the canonical and the apocryphal Gospels: and only by untrammelled historical criticism can we sift what is true in the Gospel-records from what is legendary (as for instance when we find one canonical Gospel contradicting another).

Our Lord's work as the Saviour of mankind turns upon the moral and religious character of His life, His spiritual oneness with the Father, His amazing love for men and self-sacrifice on their behalf, and His work in the hearts of those who trust Him. It does not turn on His intellectual infallibility or omniscience, which the Gospels do not represent Him as possessing. He Himself referred explicitly to one thing at least which He did not know. The very doctrine of the Incarnation means that in the human Jesus the Divine Word was operating under genuinely human conditions—physical, mental, and psychological. Orthodoxy, therefore, rules out in advance, rather than implies, that miraculous knowledge of all things which many Christians with mistaken zeal have hastened, in the teeth of the Gospel-evidence, to attribute to Jesus. Jesus on many occasions indicated the need that His hearers should ponder and weigh, that is, test, His words. True, He spoke with authority: but on several occasions when using his most authoritative formula, 'but *I* say unto you,' he added, besides the injunction, an independent reason for the injunction, suggesting that the truth of what He was saying was verifiable by intelligent listeners for themselves.

When we pass from considering the Incarnate life of Jesus on earth to the life of the exalted Christ mystically apprehended as present to the individual disciple and to the group of disciples, we are no longer considering the authority of an external human teacher as ordinarily understood. We are thinking of that which the Apostle Paul called alternatively 'the Spirit of Christ' and 'the Spirit of God,' the authority whereof is to be classed rather with that of the inward manifestations vouchsafed by God to the mind and conscience of man, than with the objective authority of those historical characters who down the ages have spoken to man in the name of God.

# THE MIRROR OF BISHOPS

By Douglas White, M.D.

IF the ordinary layman of the English Church were asked what he thought was the main function of bishops, what would he reply? One might single out ordination, confirmation, and such other ceremonials at which bishops preside. Another might name as their principal function the exercise of administrative authority, such exercise being limited by the laws of the Realm, Canon Law (where not contradicted by the laws of the Realm), and the consensus of their Episcopal Colleagues. And, doubtless, to-day administration lays a heavy burden on diocesan bishops, infinitely heavier than a hundred years ago. Administrative capacity requires tact, skill, and a knowledge of human nature. Capable administration of a big parish has not infrequently secured elevation to the episcopal bench, often with excellent results. Yet administration ought not to usurp so high a position in a bishop's functions.

What was the earliest conception of the duty of the monarchical bishop? Chiefly to secure the continuity of Christian doctrine and to bear constant witness to the truth. Nor did that, in the early centuries, mean mere conservatism, but frequent reinterpretation, often of a drastic character, so as to maintain the vital core of the Christian tradition as a way of life. That a bishop should be a good man, goes without saying; the influence of a saintly bishop is priceless. But, besides that, other qualities are to be desired; honesty, learning, courage. The combination is hard to come by; but a high position may reasonably command a high qualification.

Bishops are called Fathers in God. The function of Fathers is to bring up their children in the way they should go, not only in goodness but in truth. In short, they ought to be leaders in *thought*, not only administrators. What am I driving at? Just this. Modern scholarship and modern thought — in history, science, philosophy — has, quite frankly, made much of the traditional Christian outlook quite impossible. A great

new Reformation is coming to maturity, under our very eyes. What is the Church — what are the Churches — doing about it? We hear sermons preached in churches, from the B.B.C., from cathedrals: often excellent and eloquent exhortations to personal goodness and social righteousness, but practically never facing up to the main traditional doctrines, which nevertheless are assumed, and intended to be assumed, as the background of the preacher's thought. Yet if we take the Apostles' Creed, there are few clerics, and very few thoughtful laymen, who can recite even that creed *ex animo* without quite serious reservations. When it comes to the great festivals, Christmas, Easter, Pentecost, what has the preacher to say? Too often, 'This is not the time to go into these disputed questions,' when it obviously *is* the time. But the parish priest has indeed a difficult task, specially if he takes a Modernist view of the creeds. If he says things which the mass of his people can't swallow, he may lose much of his support, and may do much harm. Many of the older clergy feel that danger, and accordingly, in their teaching, keep off the grass of Modernist controversy. There are indeed a few who say straightforwardly what they really think; if they lose some elderlies, they gain the youth. But for the most part the parish clergy skate round the thin ice. Their business is not adventure but protection. But the bishops and the cathedral dignitaries are differently placed; their parish is the diocese, or even wider. The bishops, moreover, are assumed to be, and in many cases are, among the learned of the Church; they know, most of them, the general, or even the special, conclusions at which scholars have arrived. They are, indeed, beleaguered with endless administrative and ceremonial work; but it ought to be possible for them to face the issues frankly, and definitely to teach truth as they see it. We do not expect from them pioneer scholarship, but we do expect an open and plain statement of ascertained truth. The main contentions of literary criticism of both Old and New Testaments, combined with the doctrine of evolution, are generally accepted by bishops, no less than by other men of learning; but (with notable exceptions) no one would guess it from their sermons or their charges. What a relief it would be to many

godly souls, both men and women, if they were told, straight out, by their bishop, that their Christianity did not depend on a belief in the Virgin Birth. What a relief if they were plainly told by their bishop that they need not believe in the resuscitation of dead bodies, in a literal descent into hell or in a literal ascent into heaven, and that no Christian is required to believe in miracles as proofs of the Christian religion. 'But surely you don't expect the bishops to blurt out truths that tell against the traditional Christian faith? It is their duty not to offend any of the little ones who so believe in Christ.' I would reply, that in the mouth of Jesus, little ones *means* little ones — the young. To-day the intelligence of youth is being insulted when it is taken for granted that they all believe what in fact very few believe, at least among the younger adults. The Churches, whether Episcopal, Presbyterian or Free, are not being recruited from the young, but are kept afloat by the elderly. To that process there can be but one end.

May we not beg the bishops to follow the example of (at least) one of their number, and become leaders of religious thought? Among intelligent laymen I find very few who are not quite Modernist in outlook, though they may not care enough about it to join any Modernist movement. The same is true of the intelligent women. They are naturally, perhaps, more religious than the other sex; but they will no longer bow the knee to formulas which do not satisfy their intelligence.

But my appeal is not only to the bishops whose leaning is towards Modernism; it is equally to those whose confidence in the traditional statements is unshaken. Let them too enter the lists and state clearly what they believe, and why they believe it, both on the doctrinal issues, such as the Virgin Birth or the resurrection of the body, and on the social issues, such as marriage and divorce. There will be controversy. Controversy is life. Jesus was controversial; let us endeavour ourselves to follow in His steps. In the early centuries, bishops were leaders of controversy, right or wrong: why not to-day?

# THE COSMIC CHRIST*

*In the year that King Uzziah died I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple.*—ISAIAH VI, 1.

IN one of the supreme passages of the Old Testament, the prophet Isaiah has left us his own account of the turning point of his life, which was also to be a turning point in the history of Biblical religion. He could give a date for the event. In the last year of the long and prosperous reign of Uzziah he had a vision in the Temple. With the inward eye he saw Jehovah, his people's God, enthroned in majesty within the Temple—high, holy and lifted up. The vision reveals to him his own and his people's condition in God's sight. The cry breaks from him: 'Woe is me, for I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips, and mine eyes have seen the king, the Lord of Hosts.' Through weakness he attains strength: his lips are touched with purifying fire; his sin is purged, and he knows himself to be commissioned as the Lord's messenger to his people in the evil days which lie before him and them. God's holiness and man's sin; the need for purification and the deadly peril of failure to meet the divine demand—it is in this circle of ideas that the faith of Judaism in God transcendent, 'high and lifted up,' has its source.

But Old Testament theology did not rest here. In Isaiah and in the other early prophets God is made known in history. He calls the peoples to their work, judges them for their sins and redeems them from the power of their enemies. It is but rarely in the older prophets that we find utterances which express the thought of God as Nature's author, and in some of the few passages where this thought appears, there is good reason of another kind to suspect the hand of a later editor. For the early prophets God is primarily the just and holy King of Israel, who controls the destinies alike of Israel and of the other peoples of the earth. But if the prophetic faith was to maintain itself, it was bound in a more reflective age and in the light of a wider experience to relate its conviction of God's just and holy rule to

*A sermon preached at Oxford, before the University, in New College Chapel, on Trinity Sunday, 1934, by the Rev. J. M. Creed, D.D., Ely Professor of Divinity, University of Cambridge.

the world of nature as well as to the world of men. Stories of creation were prevalent in Babylonia. If the high and holy one were to take a place among the divine beings of antique cosmologies, could he remain the high and holy one? The Biblical doctrine that the world is the creation of the one true God is clearly articulated—perhaps for the first time—by the nameless prophet of the exile, and we may surmise that it was his answer to this dilemma. It is to be noted and remembered that the Biblical writers never set themselves to establish the existence of God, whether by argument to a necessary first cause or by an argument from evidences of design. That was not the order of ideas. The song of the seraphs in Isaiah's vision gives us the starting point:

> 'Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of Hosts,
> The whole earth is full of his glory.'

This is not a doctrine of creation, though it looks towards it. The doctrine of creation by God gives a conception of the Divine Being in relation to the world of Nature which permits that song to be sung with full force and meaning.

In the Scriptures of the New Testament we may trace a movement of faith which is in some respects analogous to that which carried the Old Testament theology to its culminating point; but in the New Testament it is a movement of faith centred upon Jesus Christ. In the matured theology of the Apostolic Church — at any rate in its chief representatives — Christ is one with the creative Word of God. 'In him,' says St. Paul, 'all things consist.' For St. John, Jesus Christ is the Word who became flesh, and through Him all things that are were made. The evidence indicates that at the end of the first Christian century this type of doctrine was not universal. On the other hand, there is no sign of abrupt transition in the development by which St. Paul and others reached this stupendous generalization about Christ and His relation to the world. Christians have fought long about the doctrine of the Lord's Person — but not in the first apostolic age. St. Paul's doctrine of the cosmic Christ seems to have asserted itself without inward strain. Yet it was a change from the primitive faith. Christianity did not start with a new cosmic doctrine. The Gospels shew us that for Jesus of Nazareth, as for His disciples, the doctrine of

God as Creator, 'Lord of heaven and earth,' stood firm. It is as certain as anything historical can be that Jesus did not say of Himself that He was God's agent or co-agent in creation, and it is scarcely less certain that no such thought was present in His mind. It is remarkable testimony to the broad historical fidelity of the Synoptic tradition that no such speculation is ever placed upon His lips. Even in *St. John* the doctrine of the Cosmic Word, which is firmly stated in the prologue, falls almost, perhaps entirely, out of sight in the narration of the incarnate life. The significant terms of thought in the Gospels are not these, and if we weigh the traditions of the Baptist and of our Lord Himself it is not doubtful what they were: sin, repentance, judgment to come, sin forgiven, the victory of the Father's love, the blessedness of the Kingdom, now hidden in men's hearts, to be gloriously revealed hereafter. A comparison with Isaiah's vision shews us the essential identity of the prophetic and the evangelical religion, and at the same time the new and distinctive feature of the Gospel: whereas the Old Testament prophet stands, himself a penitent, with the sinful nation over against the holiness of the Lord of Hosts, Jesus Christ is found to stand on the other side of the chasm; He is Himself 'the holy one of God.' Or rather, stranger still, He is on both sides at once, 'the friend of publicans and sinners,' man like themselves, yet also 'the holy one of God.' That kind of impression must go back to the very beginning, and it must have been very nearly, though not quite, at the beginning that the disciples found the explanation of the Crucifixion in that chasm that separated them, yet did not separate them, from their Master.

If we would make our own the New Testament doctrine of the cosmic Christ, we must obey that canon of the philosopher which advises us that if we would grasp what a thing in its essential nature is we must first ask how it came to be. And an answer to that question applied to our present subject is given us by the apostle St. Paul in the argument of the eighth chapter of the *Epistle to the Romans*: If it be indeed the case that there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus; if God, for our sake, has not spared His own son, then it cannot but be that 'with him he will freely give us all things.' The new bond carries a new and victorious relation to all that is: for 'I am persuaded,'

says St. Paul, 'that neither death nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus, our Lord.' From these inspired words it is not a far step to the faith that in Christ all things consist, and that in Him we touch the springs of creation. But we must remember how we got there. Neither Old Testament nor New starts with a cosmic doctrine. The starting point is a conviction that there is a moral order above man to which man is somehow related. The cosmic doctrine both of Old Testament and of New is a kind of corollary to that prior conviction.

The long and fruitful contact of Christian theology with Greek philosophy has issued in a system of divinity which has reversed this order. In the Scholastic divinity the foundations of faith are laid in a strictly rational doctrine of God. The existence of a transcendent God is first demonstrated from the order of the world. This strictly rational foundation being duly laid, the reason is invited to take cognizance of testimonies—miracle and prophecy—which guarantee to it the superstructure of supernatural revelation, embodied in the Bible, by which the transcendent Creator has made Himself known to man. Our fathers were comfortably sure that scholasticism was dead and that its value was exhausted. We are not so sure. In the intellectual confusion of the present time the austere and imposing structure of scholastic thought has been found to possess a singular attraction for some highly intelligent men, and the mind of our time has become conscious that the intellectual revolt of seventeenth and eighteenth centuries tended, like other revolts, to be blind to the strong points of the enemy. It had little perception of the real greatness of those masters who made a way for the re-birth of genuine speculative activity. This must and should be said. But when we are pressed, as we sometimes are to-day, to give in our allegiance to the classical Divinity of the mediaeval Church, it is really important that we should keep our heads. If the movement of thought from Hume to Kant means anything, it means that the supposed theological conclusion of rational thought has lost its inevitability. And if the conclusion at this stage is no longer inevitable, the whole structure of

scholasticism is imperilled. None knows better than the trained scholastic that the philosophical foundation is essential. The system requires that the natural reason be adequate to the task demanded of it. Hence it must be reinforced by all means at his disposal. But something has gone wrong when it has become necessary to invoke spiritual sanctions to guide the natural reason to its proper conclusion. 'If anyone shall say,' says the First Canon of the Vatican Council *Concerning Revelation*, 'that the one true God, our creator and Lord, cannot be certainly known by the natural light of human reason, let him be anathema.' I suppose it may still be assumed that most of us are satisfied that the movements which have displaced the methods of the old Divinity from the universal sway which they once exercised cannot be set aside as mere eccentricities or provincialisms of thought, and that those who anticipate that the intellectual confusion in which it is our lot to live points to the reinstatement of the scholastic scheme are foredoomed in the long run to disillusionment. Yet those of us who are most opposed to these attempts to revivify the past can recognize that the scholastic divinity has great merits, when it is compared not only with the loose and vague teaching which too often passes muster among us, but also with some of the serious theological schools which have arisen since the time of Kant. The scholastic divine holds fast and sure his faith in one God, creator and redeemer. In the system of the angelic Doctor there is no danger, no possibility of divorce between the God of natural philosophy and the God of revelation. The situation has been otherwise with some post-Kantian theologies. A great and justly influential system has taken as the cardinal principle of its thinking the distinction between judgments of existence and judgments of value. The latter only, it is held, are proper to theology. Metaphysics is systematically excluded. The theologian takes account of metaphysics, but only to distinguish it from his own approach. In a time of sore need Ritschl led the Church in Germany back to Jesus Christ its Lord, and his justification is written in the history of theology in the second half of the nineteenth century. None the less it was a grave impoverishment to religion when theology was no longer allowed to attempt a world view, and barely to relate itself to anything outside its

proper sphere of justification by faith. The conception of God as Creator fell into the background, and the thought of Christ exalted and glorified was rigorously excluded. Jesus Christ, the man of Nazareth who for us sinners has the value of God — that for Ritschlians was the meaning of the Christian Gospel.

The situation to-day is so far changed that the qualities which helped Ritschl to his supremacy have now become an impediment. At the time when Ritschl was finding his feet in Germany, science, history and theology were all seeking emanicpation from the yoke of a dominant philosophy. Positive knowledge was the order of the day. Our time is witnessing the turn of the tide. One of the most familiar features of the intellectual life of the present generation is the rediscovery of philosophical problems from within the sciences. For instance, laws of nature are no longer conceived as external rigidities of causal sequence. 'Causality,' writes a very eminent physicist in a recently published book,[1] 'may be considered as a mode of perception by which we reduce our sense impressions to order.' And again: 'The discovery of the quantum of action shows us, in fact, not only the natural limitation of classical physics, but, by throwing a new light upon the old philosophical problem of the objective existence of phenomena independently of our observations, confronts us with a situation hitherto unknown in natural science.' The immediate point is not whether the physicists have found a satisfactory metaphysic, but the fact that physicists are being driven from within their own field to grapple with the problem of knowledge. So great a change in interest and perspective must have reactions upon religion. It is no longer so much a question of distinguishing a realm of ends from a realm of nature, but rather of finding the real relation between them. There must be some relation. For each of us is in some sense a unity, and in our experience the realms do actually meet. Our faith, therefore, which concerns our personal relation to all we know, must be a faith about God and the world. Christianity must be a cosmic faith, or it must die.

* * * * *

The grave questions on which I have so lightly touched do not concern only physicists, philosophers and theologians, but

[1] Niels Bohr, *Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature*, pp. 115, 116, 117.

every man and woman. The theoretical problems have their roots in ordinary experience. It is essential to the health of society that the plain man and the academic student should keep some awareness that at bottom they are both concerned with the same problems. Whether we know much or little, we all live in the same world, and that which is really true is true for all. Let me then, as I close, try to make a plain statement of the case as I see it.

Fundamental is the recognition by man of a standard by which he ought to live. And here I briefly digress to notice an objection. There have been ages when society has been able to assume the validity of some settled code of conduct. It has known a law which, written or unwritten, has claimed its allegiance. Such ages, it will be allowed, have yielded a ready assent to this idea of a standard. But we live in a time when moral questions seem to be all unsettled. The accepted codes are all open to criticism and debate. Quite so. Yet is it not necessary to allow that criticism and debate are themselves only possible because the terms good and evil have a meaning, and because, however any given question may be answered, the idea of a standard is first assumed? 'This is the distinction of Moral Philosophy,' wrote Coleridge, '. . . that I assume a something, the proof of which no man can *give* to another, yet every man may *find* for himself. If any man assert that he cannot find it, I am bound to disbelieve him. I cannot do otherwise without unsettling the very foundations of my own moral nature.' Can any one of us refuse his assent to that assertion? I think not.

Without this starting point, the distinctively Christian doctrine of God's gracious love which is ours in Jesus Christ is, so far as I can see, unintelligible and even misleading. God, because in His inmost being He is a God of Love, reaches across the chasm our shortcomings create, yet never does he relax his demand on men. Christian doctrine, if it is true to the Gospel, will enforce these two aspects of the Divine character at once.

I contend, then, that the recognition of a standard is implicit in human nature, and that the distinctively Christian doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement are, in the first place at any rate, to be read and understood only in the light of that

standard. But there is much else in man's experience. He lives in a varied world, a world not only of persons but of things. To this world, too, man is for ever adjusting himself. The immense complexities of science are based upon our common human experience of that world — extended, but not essentially changed, by the careful use of scientific method. How are these aspects of our life to be related? With the assumption that the quest for unity of some sort is no mere disease of the mind, but an essential requirement of our rational nature, Faith makes 'the good' the principle of unity, and here and now anticipates the final unveiling of the mysteries of existence. In such an anticipation man, as I believe, may — nay *must* — use unqualified language from which, in the conditions of our present existence, man as scientist, man as moralist, man as philosopher might shrink. But it is man all the time, and faith which is not faith about the common world of man, as well as faith in God and Christ, cannot remain faith.

> 'Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord of Hosts';
>
> 'Worthy is the Lamb that was slain . . . '

and 'Every creature which is in heaven and on earth . . . heard I saying, Blessing, and honour and glory and power, be unto him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb, for ever and ever. Amen.'

# THE PRAYING OF A PREPOSTEROUS PADRE

By Rev. Stanley McKelvie, M.A., D.D.

THE purpose of this article is to deal with prayer from the point of view of my own personal experience: firstly outlining this science of prayer; and, secondly, narrating how three men have worked along these lines in a quiet prayer dynamo over a period of twenty-five years.

You have at least three minds. You have your conscious mind, your subconscious mind, and your superconscious mind. It is probably correct to say that these three minds of yours are only divisions, or extensions, of your one mind. And, by

the way, your conscious mind is only two per cent. of the rest of your mind.

Our superconscious mind is not the fractional, but the real of us. It is the realm of our spiritual faculties. We are spiritual beings here and now, and we live in a spiritual universe here and now. This is opposed to the ordinary view, which is that it is only when we die that we become spiritual. We are in reality spiritual beings — spiritual beings who perchance have existed from eternity. In our superconscious mind we have the most wonderful spiritual powers. For the most part these powers lie dormant. Sometimes, however, we touch the fringe — we touch certain rates of vibration which bring corresponding power. I suppose most of us, when on holiday on the sea shore, like to set up a big stone and to shie little stones at it. After missing the mark for a long time, there comes to us the certainty — from a sudden sense of complete co-ordination of poise and aim — that this shot will hit it. It does. So at times, from a sudden poise of soul, we sense illimitable life and the freedom of our spirit forces. Our spiritual powers can be developed, just as we develop our physical powers. The physical power of observation can be developed. A friend of mine went for a walk with a bird-lover. During the walk my friend saw twenty birds; the other saw forty — he had developed his physical powers of observation. And so we can develop the finer forces and the spiritual powers of our superconscious mind.

The function of our superconscious mind is to realize truth intuitively and to see God. The superconscious mind only sees principles. *It is our spiritual aerial to which are broadcast the revelations of the Most High.*

What is beyond? What is beyond our superconscious mind? The Universal Mind — the Mind of God. The Universal Mind is not located in any place; it is everywhere, just as the ether is everywhere. St. Paul says, 'In Him we live and move and have our being.' God is infinite, and His Mind surrounds our life like a crystal sea. The cure for all ills comes through unity with the Universal Mind. Such unity, such at-one-ment, is the destiny of every soul. That His disciples might attain such unity was the prayer of the Seneschal of Eternity

when He trod these earthly shores : 'I pray that ye may be one with the Father, even as I am one with the Father.' *The Mind of God is the Divine broadcasting station of the universe.*

How does our superconscious mind make contact with the Universal Mind of God? This is what, through the ages, the mystics of the world have tried to find out. They have tried fasting, crucifixion, humiliation of the flesh; some, like Saint Simeon Stylites, have lived for years on the top of a lofty pillar; some have preached a trance-like nirvana. All have sought how to touch the Divine.

Advanced Christian seers to-day say that we 'contact' God in the Silence.

1. Put by a time at morning and night when you can be alone with God.
2. Completely relax your whole body.
3. Enter the great Silence, completely divesting yourself of all earthly thoughts and feelings.
4. Don't leave your mind a blank and see what will come. This would only mean that your subconscious mind would be the positive factor, and that you would become psychic.
5. Set a keynote by holding shortly a word or sentence descriptive of universal principle. Don't think of someone who is joyful : think of pure joy. Above all, think of the attributes of God.
6. So will your superconscious mind become receptive to the Universal Mind, and you will receive inspiration from the Most High.

*Entering the Silence is equivalent to tuning-in in radio.*

A famous astronomer was pointing out to a friend the wonder of the starry heavens. At last he said that, wonderful and important though the firmament was, he knew something much more wonderful and of supreme importance—willingness to receive. And when our superconscious mind is receptive and we are willing to receive, God comes down to us. Let go and let God.

The books of a certain man refused to balance. For two months he worked in vain to find out where his mistake was. The

man's wife, and a friend of mine who is a celebrated clergyman, met together, and held for him the thought of the one Mind which is in all and through all and knows all. At the same moment, some miles away, the man turned again to the books which he had put aside in despair : and like a flash the mistake was revealed. His hand opened the book at the right page, and his mind grasped the error. Neither my friend nor the wife knew what the mistake was.

Another friend of mine, an advanced seer, was very interested in gramophones. He could not make a sound-box to give a perfect rendering of the human voice. And then in rest it came to him to fashion the sound-box into the shape of the human throat. A perfect sound-box resulted. This was four years before this discovery was adopted by one of the world's leading gramophone firms.

A lady suddenly had a vision, in which an aeroplane caught fire and crashed to the ground, two men in it being burnt beyond recognition. As the picture was seen, a voice seemed to say 'Three-thirty.' She realized that she had seen clairvoyantly a picture of the probable future : and she also realized that she could, by contacting the Universal Mind of God, bring down the perfect security of God to guard the threatened men. She told the friend with whom she was staying : and they treated for about an hour. Shortly before 3.30 they went to the window, and at exactly 3.30 saw an aeroplane on fire emerge from a cloud, which ultimately crashed by the house. The clothes of the two men in it were unsinged, and several standing by said it was the most marvellous thing they had ever witnessed. The pilot, who turned out to be the son of the lady of the house, said that at one time he thought he would have to throw himself over because he 'could see there was no escape from what appeared a hasty end.' But he 'suddenly became conscious of a wonderful feeling of peace and security,' which he said was almost overwhelming.

A somewhat similar thing happened in connection with myself. There is a dear lady in England who prays for me and mine. One day in India I received a letter from her saying that on two nights running she had awakened at 3 a.m. feeling that I was in desperate danger. On both occasions she had got out

of bed and claimed for me the infinite security which is in the Mind of God. She went to sleep feeling that danger was averted. When I got this letter I wracked my brains to remember what danger I had recently passed through. I could remember none. But a few days later I was driving my car on the Kashmir road, one of the most dangerous in the Empire, with a hill on one side and a desperate drop on the other: and the back wheel of my car came off! When the accident happened I was on the one spot in the road where it was safe, and I was driving at four miles an hour.

A last instance. I write religious booklets for my sporting friends—very poor things, but mine own. One day I got a letter from a total stranger saying she had found one of my booklets in a corner of an office, and that it had helped her in the crisis of her life. She said that her husband was the trouble. I called round—rather wondering if the man would give me a thick ear. The man came to the door: took me in: and we palled up. Things looked a bit queer. They were living by the light of candles, for instance, the electric light having been cut off. Then the man told me. He was right on the rocks. He had had a magnificent job, and lost it through drink and bad companions. He said to me, 'Sir, I have come to see that I can't save myself, and that I must turn to God.' I told him that about contacting the Mind of God in the Silence: and how so doing would bring down into materialization prosperity and supply. We three had silent prayer together. From that time things started to get better, and not so long after I had a joyful letter to say he had got a job and placed an order for £15,000.

A final word is necessary. If this theory of prayer is rightly followed, it is my belief that certain results will automatically be manifest in life and character. Character, of course, is always a by-issue.

(1) Evil complexes, hidden in the recesses of the mind, will be cleansed away. There are to-day various mental methods by which poisonous complexes are unearthed from the mind. Such methods I have come to regard with much suspicion. Whereas if my mind is flooded by the eternal whiteness of the Mind of God, it must be cleansed and healed.

Take the simile of a tank full of poison fish. You may, of course, try to get them out by fishing for them with a rod and line. It will take you years. But if you pass an electric current through the water the poison fish will die in a split second and float to the surface. The Mind of God is the Divine Dynamic of cleansing and healing.

(2) The power of judgment will be enhanced. This will be the main result. I cannot insist on this too strongly. God does indeed guide by blinding flashes of inspiration and incandescent flame of intuition, but such guidance is very much abnormal and reserved for special times. I have come rather to distrust such experiences, or at any rate to see that they must be balanced by judgment. This is His main method of guidance. And when our mind contacts the Divine Mind, our faculty of judgment—our most vital power—becomes clarified.

(3) There will come the realization of what prayer really is. *Prayer is the grateful acceptance of the Good which eternally belongs to us.*

How many of us really rely on prayer? How many of us bet on it? How many of us bank on the answer coming? Most of us only really pray when we are up against it—like the little girl. She was climbing up a sloping roof, when she stumbled and started slipping towards the edge. In mortal fear she cried out: 'Oh Lord, save me! Oh Lord, save me! Oh Lord—it's all right, Lord, I've caught on a nail.'

God, sooner or later, answers prayer. But the fact remains that some prayers are answered more quickly than others. It depends on how we pray. I have never forgotten hearing Archbishop Davidson say from the pulpit, 'After all, the only thing in life that really matters is the *way* we say our prayers.' Prayer is a science. Prayer has to conform to laws. In these days, when the wonders of the cosmic life are being unveiled, we are beginning to apprehend the right rationale of prayer.

This method of praying in the Silence has been adopted by three men, who have regularly met together to pray, with intervals, over a period of twenty-five years. A butler: a commercial traveller: and a preposterous padre.

When I was first ordained I went as a curate to one of the biggest parishes in England — a parish in which is a world-famous football club. I still follow the fortunes of this club, bless it! After a bit I was put in charge of the men's work in the parish. I was up a gum tree. I knew nothing about the working man, and considered him a ferocious and desperate fellow. Still, there was this job shoved on to me, and it was up to me to do my best. But what to do? — as Babu friend says.

What I did was this. I got two of my friends to pray with me over the work. Every Wednesday night we met in my rooms at 10 p.m. We drank cocoa, smoked, swopped yarns, and made an appalling row. If our housekeeper came in to protest, we told her it was a temperance meeting. Then we settled down to business. We each brought forward things in our men's work which wanted praying for. This contributing of subjects for prayer was called 'putting into the pot' — just as on a hunting expedition everyone brings his contribution for the cooking-pot. The different subjects for prayer were jotted down on a piece of paper. Then we knelt down: one of us read out the list: and together we prayed in silence for each item in turn. We called this meeting our dynamo. We kept it up for four years. The result was wonderful.

Our weekly men's Bible Class crammed its hall out. Our monthly men's service went up to an attendance of 700. The influence of the work was felt all over the city. At the end of the three years, eleven men came to me in a body. They said: 'Sir, before we came to the men's class we were reckless men. We have been transformed into decent citizens through the influence of the class. We want to do something in return. Can you give us any work?' We had at that time in the parish a big mission church in one of the worst quarters. It was empty. I turned it over to these eleven men. They formed themselves into an evangelistic band. They gave their time, their money, and themselves. *And they crammed that mission church three times every Sunday night.* God answers prayer.

I left my parish to be a chaplain in India — which step I have never regretted. When, after nineteen years, I finally returned to England, my first move was to look up my two old pals with whom I had regularly prayed. We had all changed

and become broader in our vision. Unfortunately W—— was down and almost out. He had been out of work for four years and was in deep penury, and he was suffering from a disease in his hands which the doctors pronounced incurable. He, like myself, had been to the War.

We again started our prayer dynamo. For a year now we have been meeting every fortnight in my house. We look forward to these times with the utmost keenness. Only we have altered our procedure. We do not kneel to pray : we relax quietly in our seats. Part of the time is devoted to silent prayer for certain definite objects, as we used to do twenty years ago; and part of the time is devoted to entering the Silence together and to contacting the Mind of God.

I will mention one result. W—— has been led to a peculiar kind of treatment, and is now completely healed of the disease in his hands ! And very marvellously, so it seems, he has quite recently got a magnificent job !

Here is a way to save our tired world.

Chemical galvanism possesses this peculiarity, than an increase of its powers cannot be gained by increasing the dimensions of the cells of the battery, but only by increasing their number. Even so, this planet needs more Silent Circles for prayer. This article is the Muezzin, the call to prayer.

Here is a way to save our tired world. I say that deliberately. If only men and women would meet together, firstly to pray silently for definite things, and, secondly, to enter the eternal Silence together, then in a few short years wars and enmities would cease, poverty would be no more, sickness would vanish like the night. I believe that there is excitement in heaven over this suggestion. And if in every church in our land we had such silent circles, the Millenium would come in this generation !

# THE BIRTH OF THE HOLY INQUISITION

By Francis S. Darwin, M.A.

THE story of the origin and the development of the 'Holy Office'[1] — as a historical subject, to be handled by professed historians — is a theme that may not appear, at first sight, to come within the province of a writer concerned, primarily, with questions of mere inquisitorial procedure. Of the latter problem, however, the most cursory examination will soon show that, for anything like a proper appreciation of its working, some sort of historical survey of the stages, through which the institution in question grew to its later greatness, is certainly desirable, if not altogether necessary. Nor does any such preliminary review seem to have been left to us[2] that can be regarded as an entirely satisfying combination of detail and conciseness — a fact responsible, in part, for the deficiencies of the following sketch.

In a thirteenth-century European country the despatch, into the dioceses and the provinces, of royal officials empowered to investigate the proceedings of local authorities and to enforce a reform of abuses, was a device by no means untried—and that in the heyday of feudalism. The practice had been resorted to, as far back as the time of Charlemagne (771-814) and his immediate successors, in the visitations of their well-known *Missi* — whose duties included 'amendment' of any lack of justice in the law courts, enforcement of the canonical rule of life on clergy and, generally, the conduct of *inquisitions* 'as to everything where necessary.' Much later something of the same nature had been seen in England in the circuits of itinerant justices initiated by Henry I; while in France an analogous system was in vogue under St. Louis IX (1226-70), of whom we are told that 'He would constantly send diligent and trusty *Inquisiteurs* through his kingdom, and cause wrongs to be amended' — a system continued after his death, as for instance in 1303 and

[1] 'Omnia in hoc officio sunt sancta.' Limborch, p. 158 (1692).

[2] By *e.g.* Vacandard, pp. 146-7; Tanon, pp. 114-18, 172-5; 'De Lauzons,' I pp. 438-49; Lea, I pp. 428-30, II pp. 162-9.

1306 when we find royal *Inquisiteurs* or *Inquisitores* busy in Auvergne and Beaujolais reviewing grievances against the administrative and judicial authorities.[3] In the spiritual realm, on the other hand — though approval of carefully regulated inquisitions, for 'the punishment of subjects' excesses,' had been expressed by the Vatican Council of 1215[4] — no permanent and stable judicial barrier against the creeping advance, the mole-like activities, of the arch-enemy, the heretic — an enemy as formidable to that sphere as the dishonest official and the turbulent baron to the secular State — had been erected, up to at least 1230, by the authority primarily concerned — the Papacy. A sort of parochial hue and cry after the unorthodox had been ordered, it is true, by the Councils of Verona (1184), Avignon (1209), Montpellier (1215), Narbonne (1227), and Toulouse (1229), the last two of which had emphasized the *inquisitorial* nature of the proceedings;[5] but the espionage and investigations of these so-called 'synodal witnesses' seem to have proved as unfruitful as they must certainly have been invidious. Equally unimpressive was the general result of any similar activities undertaken by the busy and harassed bishops in order to comply with the Verona and Lateran decrees of 1184 and 1215; or in connexion with the constitution issued for Lombardy, in March 1224, by the Emperor Frederick II — for the mutilation or burning of every heretic convicted by '*the diocesan*, or by an ecclesiastical dignitary[6] of the city in which he lives.'

The consequence of this parochial and episcopal inertia was what might have been expected—a revival of the heresies taught by the Cathares and the Waldenses; whose renewed activity, after all the bloodshed of the Albigensian Crusade (1208-18), must have suggested to the ever-watchful Papacy a clamant need for the adoption of some new departure in its warfare

[3] See Pertz, *Leges* I, pp. 97-8, 164, 174, 452, 498, 551 (802-84); Du Cange, *Glossarium* IV, pp. 373-5, V, pp. 421-2 (ed. 1885).

[4] Mansi XXII, 994 (Canon 8). *Cf.* P. Fournier, *Les Officialités*, pp. 266-9 (1880).

[5] 'De haeresi . . . *inquirant*' (*Narbonne*); '*Inquirant* haereticos . . . domos perscrutando.' (Toulouse). Mansi XXIII 24, 194.

[6] 'Antistes.' Pertz, *Leges* II, p. 253; Raynaldus II, p. 40 ('Cum ad Conservandum').

against the irrepressible sectaries. The successor of Innocent III, instigator of the above-mentioned crusade, had been Honorius III (1216-27)—whose title to fame will ever rest on the formal sanction given by him, in 1216 and 1223 respectively, to the rules adopted by the newly-born 'Mendicant Orders' of Dominic and Francis; and what more natural in the next Pope, Gregory IX (March 1227—August 1241), than the conviction that a new weapon for the extermination of heresy had thus been providentially forged for the Church in the burning enthusiasm, the missionary zeal, of the latest recruits in the service of Christ? So it came about that, within four years of Gregory's accession, there was heard, for the first time[7] in such connexion, the word 'Inquisitor' coming from what may appear a somewhat surprising, yet not inappropriate, quarter—the mouth of Anibaldi, 'Senator' of Rome, in an ordinance promulgated by him, significantly enough, just after the publication, in February 1231, of Gregory's severe decretal 'Excommunicamus'—for the execution of which the ordinance was plainly intended: 'Heretics found in the City, especially by *Inquisitors given by the Church* and other Catholic men, let the Senator be bound to take and detain, to be punished, after condemnation by the Church, with *chastisement due*'[8]—an exordium followed by instructions for various coercive measures, and by incineration of a few obstinate heretics. Such was the challenge flung down by Rome, in the opening of the new campaign against heresy—this in the Pope's own city, and with its chief secular official as his mouthpiece: the ordinance, too, was obviously meant as an authorized pattern for other rulers to follow.

Thirteen months later, in March 1232, occurs the second mention of Inquisitors of Heresy—the first mention of *Mendicants* acting in that capacity, and under direct delegation from the Pope himself—in the words of an edict issued at Ravenna, by the Emperor Frederick II, to all ecclesiastical and secular

[7] Though see Paramo, p. 177, for a *soi-disant* imperial 'edict' about 'Inquisitors of Heretical Depravity' represented as working in Sicily in *1224* (!)—a document termed by Lea II, p. 287, 'a most impudent forgery,' and omitted by Huillard-Bréholles, as pointed out by Amabile, p. 49.

[8] Auvray, *Registres de Grégoire* IX, Nos. 540-1; Raynaldus II, p. 39.

officials throughout his dominions, commanding the seizure and safe custody of any heretics 'found by *Inquisitors given by the Apostolic See*' as also their execution after condemnation — besides announcing the committal of 'the business of the Faith,' and ordering all possible assistance to be given, to the *Friars Preachers*, already reported in February as passing through Brabant on their way to combat heresy in Germany.[9] In May 1232 came the turn — after Italy and Germany — of Spain, when the Archbishop of Tarragona and his Suffragans were desired by Gregory to proceed against disobedient heretics and defamed persons, as well as their favourers, defenders, and receivers, 'of yourselves and the *Friars Preachers*, with others whom you may know to be fitted for this, according to Our statutes newly promulgated against heretics, which We transmit enclosed under Our Seal,'[10] *i.e.* according to the decretal 'Excommunicamus' and, possibly, its interpretation by Anibaldi. In November we encounter the first mention, by name and with his full title, of an individual Inquisitor — this in Gregory's directions to 'Brother Alberico,' *of the Order of Preachers, Inquisitor of Heretical Pravity* in Lombardy,' to lift an anathema pronounced by a legate against the district of Bergamo.[11]

Such was the birth, in a very troubled world, of the mediaeval Inquisition — its sponsors, the heads of Church and State. The event furnished but a prelude to the almost feverish activity of one of the partners, that marked the ensuing year 1233—this time mainly for the benefit of France. For in April the *Dominican* brother Robert — noted, later, for the excesses to which he owed his nickname 'Robert le Bougre' — was directed by Gregory to extirpate heresy from La Charité and its district. The *Dominican* Priors and their brethren — entrusted already with the 'business of the Faith' in the ecclesiastical provinces of Bordeaux, Bourges, Narbonne, Auxerre, Vienne, Aix, Arles, Embrun — were instructed to proceed against defenders of heretics,

[9] The constitution 'Commissi Nobis Coelitus,' printed by Pertz, *ibid.* p. 289; Cherubini I, p. 83; Sbaralea I, p. 741, and others. *Cf.* Ripoll, *Bullarium Fratrum Praedicatorum* I, p. 37.

[10] Ripoll I, p. 38; Potthast, *Regesta* 8932 (26th May, 1232).

[11] *Ibid.* p. 41; *ibid.* 9051; Auvray 947 (3rd November).

[12] *Ibid.* p. 45; *ibid.* 9152; *ibid.* 1253 (19th April, 1233).

and for that purpose to call in the aid of the secular arm if needed, 'repressing opposition by ecclesiastical censure not subject to appeal' as well as by the deprivation of recalcitrant clerks[13]; and *Dominicans* were told to hold an *Inquisition* against the heretics of Toulouse, Carcassonne, Albi, and Agen.[14] On the same day, the *Dominican* Provincial of Toulouse was bidden, in the menacing decretal 'Ille Humani Generis,' to send suitable brethren — 'learned in the law of the Lord' — to make a 'general preaching' against heresy in his province, to grant three years' remission of penance for counsel or aid in attacks on the castles of heretics and their favourers, and to prosecute all heretics with their receivers, defenders, favourers, as well as those defamed of heresy — absolving any willing to abjure, and 'enjoining on them what is usually enjoined on such,'[15] *i.e.* — as an Inquisitor grimly observed — crosses on the dress, a bread and water diet, and the duty of standing at a church door on certain Sundays and festivals.[16] Some two months later Gregory turned his gaze towards northern Europe, writing vehemently to the fanatical priest Conrad of Marburg — now chiefly famous as the confessor and brutal tormentor of St. Elizabeth of Hungary (1207-31) — as also to the diocesans of Mainz and Hildesheim, to invoke 'the power of the material as well as of the spiritual sword' against the obscenities of a newly-detected sect of heretics and their favourers[17]; while, a week afterwards, certain *Dominican Inquisitors* at work in Burgundy were directed to thrust relapsed suspects into perpetual prison.[18]

Of 1234, only two papal letters, pertinent to our subject, appear to have survived — those addressed in February to the Archbishops of Reims and Sens with their suffragans, commending to them the *Friars Preachers* as 'apter to confute heretics' and as specially fitted for extirpation of the perverse dogmas of sundry reptiles who, after lurking privily in the dust,

[13] *Ibid.* p. 47; Potthast 9153 (20th April)—*referred to, from now, as P.*

[14] Muratori, *Scriptores Rerum Italicarum* III, i, 573; P. 9155—somewhat vague (22nd April).

[15] Ripoll I, p. 47 ; P. *ibid.*

[16] Eymerich, *Directorium* p. 642 (ed. 1607).

[17] Ripoll I, pp. 51-4; Raynaldus II, p. 89; P 9226 (10th and 13th June); Lea II, p. 326.

[18] *Ibid.* p. 55; *ibid.* 9235; Auvray, 1415 (17th June).

were openly laying snares for the Catholic faith.[19] The following year 1235 was marked, however, by a fresh outburst of papal activity: on April 30th Gregory wrote to congratulate Jaime I of Aragon and the Archbishop of Tarragona on their decision to entrust the duty of *Inquisition* against heretics to the *Friars Preachers* and other clerics — enclosing also 'a certain instrument' drawn up by the *Dominican* Raymond of Peñafort for their guidance;[20] on August 21st the *Dominican* Provincial of France was directed to entrust to the afore-mentioned brother Robert, as well as to other suitable brethren, 'the business of an Inquisition' throughout the realm — this in consequence of the recent 'ebullition of a multitude of poisonous reptiles.'[21] On the next day the Archbishop of Sens was admonished to proceed against heretics 'according to the statutes newly issued' — lending, also, counsel aid and favour to the same friar and to 'other *Friars Preachers* of Ours' in their *Inquisition*[22]; on August 23rd Robert himself was informed of his mission.[23] On November 25th the *Dominican* Provincial of Tuscany and Spoleto, as also certain of his brethren, were commended by the Pope to the secular authorities of those regions—with a view to the institution of procedings against harbourers of heretics and persons defamed of heresy[24]; and it was at some time during this year that Brother Ferrar — *Dominican* Prior at Narbonne, and *Inquisitor* in that district — condemned, at Perpignan, one Chatbert as a harbourer of heretics.[25] A lull in these papal activities seems to have left the year 1236 a blank; and in 1237 nothing more exciting appears to have occurred than the despatch of the decretal 'Ille Humani Generis' to the *Dominican* Provincial of Lombardy.[26] Finally, on April 24th, 1238, a new field for inquisitorial operations was indicated by the in-

[19] Ripoll I, p. 66; Varin, *Archives Administratives de Reims* I, 2, p. 573; P. 9386, 9388.

[20] Paramo, *De Origine*, p. 177 (1598); Diago, *Historia* f. 7v (1599)— both of whom seem to have seen the original, which is not referred to by Potthast or Jordan, and apparently remains unpublished.

[21] Ripoll I, p. 80; P. 9993; Auvray 2736.

[22] *Ibid.* p. 80; *ibid.* 9994.

[23] *Ibid.* p. 81; *ibid.* 9995; *ibid.* 2735.

[24] Ripoll I, p. 81; P. 10053.

[25] Archives of Aragon, *Parchment* 762.

[26] Ripoll I, p. 95; P. 10362 (20th May).

defatigable Pontiff in a letter addressed to the *Franciscan* Provincial of Navarre and to the *Dominican* brother Pedro de Leodegaria, both stationed at Pampeluna — complaining that most of the country was infected by heresy, to be proceeded against with the sword of God's word 'which, to the prophet's thinking, ye should not debar from blood.'[27]

From now it was on the desperate conflict with the Emperor that papal attention was concentrated: in March 1239 came Frederick's excommunication; there followed his invasion of the Papal States; and in August 1241, at the very moment when the imperial forces were closing in on Rome itself, Gregory IX, the fiery and indomitable old man who had been the real founder of the Holy Inquisition — the Pope through whom, in the words of his triumphant enemy, 'peace was lacking and dissension flourished' — was snatched from his would-be captor by death. He had lived for some ninety-three years.[28]

Thus we see that (1) 'it was at Rome that the institution began, and it was from there that the impulse proceeded which was presently to bring the "Inquisitor Haereticae Pravitatis" almost everywhere'[29]; (2) it was the Friars who served as the papal instruments—of whom the Dominicans had a start of nearly six years in advance of their rivals; (3) it was the practice of the Pope, in the earliest days of the Holy Office, either to name an Inquisitor himself or to depute the duty to the Provincial most nearly concerned or most likely to be of use. In the last-mentioned expedient 'Gregory had hit upon the device which remained the permanent basis of the Inquisition — the selection by the Provincials of certain fitting brethren'[30] — a statement applicable, however, only to mediaeval Inquisitors, and even then only with numerous exceptions.

[27] *Ibid.* p. 101; *ibid.* 10583; Sbaralea, *Bullarium Franciscanum* I, p. 238; Wadding, *Annales Minorum* III, p. 5.

[28] Raynaldus II, p. 276. *Cf.* Milman, *Latin Christianity* IV, p. 313 (ed. 1857).

[29] Mgr. Douais, *L'Inquisition*, p. 135 (1900).

[30] Lea I, p. 329.

# RESTATEMENT

By Professor W. Norman Pittenger, General Theological Seminary, New York.

WE are being told on all sides that one of the crying needs of our time is the restatement of the Christian faith in terms of modern thought. This is certainly correct, but it is not always realized that a great deal more is involved than might at first sight seem apparent. Such a restatement, set in the context of the current world view, will be the best apologetic for Christianity in our day; but it will not be Christian unless it is loyal to *all* of the *essential* emphases of the historic faith; and it is to be achieved, not by any further tinkering with the classical theology, but by the development of a new theology, which, however, will carefully preserve the fundamental Christian facts and values which the older systems also enshrined in their own way.

The new Christian theology must present basic Christianity in the light of the philosophical and scientific outlook generally accepted by the world to-day. The older theologies were not created in such a context, and they can never be adapted to it. Surely that is as plain as day. We live in a world whose extent has been stretched beyond our farthest imagining, both in space and time. Biology has established our descent from animal ancestors, although it has not for one moment made belief in creation by God an impossibility. We have been brought to look at the universe from an evolutionary standpoint, seeing it as a gigantic movement or process. It is no longer a neat and compact little three-storey world into which the traditional scheme of creation, fall and salvation can be fitted.

Christianity involves, as we have intimated, certain basic data and beliefs which must at all costs be retained. But these do not in their essence conflict with the learning of the new age; it is only their temporary expressions which will not make sense in our day. The statement of the real nucleus of Christianity varies with the particular intellectual climate of the period in which it is preached. There is nothing divine about these expositions of the faith; the important thing is the faith itself.

Even the creeds have value only because they enshrine and pass on the beliefs which are at the heart of Christianity. We may be convinced that they state those foundation truths, but we must not claim more than that; and we certainly dare not insist on too literal an interpretation of their several clauses. The important thing about them is not their details but their maintenance of a fundamental position which is specifically Christian. That position, briefly, is: that the universe is created and sustained by an ultimate super-personal Reality whom we call God, who is Father of our spirits; that his supremely loving self-expression to us men centres in the divine-human life of Jesus Christ, who rose victorious over death and is now at the heart of that spiritual Reality; that this revelation is continued and made available to-day by the Holy Spirit in the Church. There are some additional credenda, such as forgiveness of sins, judgment and eternal life. But here we have the fundamental Christian position; and it is with the setting of that group of facts and beliefs in the context of a modern world-view that apologetics is to-day concerned.

This outlook is 'modernism,' we may be told. But what of that? It happens that it is true, and that is all that matters. We know that the ancient theologies have at their heart the faith for which we must be prepared to die, and to live. But they are quite plainly temporary statements of the religion as it was envisaged in particular times and places and by particular men. Our task is to build a new structure to house the faith which we all hold.

We must not forget, of course, that the older formulations contain many insights too valuable ever to be lost, insights which we must see are preserved in any future statements of Christianity. And we should not for a moment think that our religion depends for its truth on the fact that science finds room for it to-day, or that philosophy looks towards it in a friendly manner. Religion (and therefore Christianity) is true, if it is true at all, because it brings men most intimately into contact with Ultimate Reality and most adequately discloses to them the inner nature of that Reality and their essential relationship to it.

On the other hand, it should be remembered that philosophical and scientific study make impossible any religion but the

highest; they are, as it were, the threshing floor on which are beaten out the chaff of bad science and inadequate metaphysics. That means that we must strive to present Christianity clearly, coherently, intelligently, shirking no issues. We must not claim that we have the whole truth — and with von Hügel we may well be suspicious of all nicely-rounded systems. But we must be sure to face all truth from every side, and interpret the faith honestly in the light of what we have learned about our actual world and our human situation.

As a result, we modern Christians shall in the long run be compelled to abandon much that we may have valued. We shall be obliged to give up a crude intrusionist conception of creation, revelation and religious experience; a catastrophic view of the Incarnation which utterly separates God's concentrated presence and work in Christ from His more diffused presence and work elsewhere in history; the idea that Deity can be found in the gaps of our human knowledge, in the places where we cannot trace the causal nexus, rather than in the whole grand system.

We shall be compelled to reconsider the nucleus of the faith itself, and to see, for example, that the manner of our Lord's birth is relatively unimportant, but that God's Incarnation in Christ is all-important. Our doctrine of man, original sin, atonement and salvation must be re-thought, with drastic changes. There must be an alteration in the view of inspiration of Holy Scripture and the place of Scripture in the Christian tradition. Our attitude towards the non-Christian religions must move from one in which they are regarded as absolutely false to one where they are seen as real and divine preparations, true in their inadequate measure, looking for the great fulfilment of Jesus Christ.

Such a general change in outlook is already accepted by many of our leading scholars; but it has not penetrated the parish clergy nor the laity to anything like the extent to which it is needed. Nor can it while we keep on repeating the old formulae in our services; or at least (as the present writer is rather inclined to think, since he values the retention, if it be possible, of the form of words as a symbol of continuity of belief with the great Christian tradition) until we make absolutely clear,

to the thinking world and to the laity generally, the real nature of the historic creeds and our present-day profession of them. Among suggested 'new creeds,' the most satisfactory would seem to be a definite affirmation along lines once laid down by Dr. Bethune-Baker. Such a creed might state :

> 'I believe in God our Father, Maker of all things visible and invisible ; and in Jesus Christ, His Son our Lord, God manifest in human life, crucified for us, risen from the dead, ascended into heaven ; and in the Spirit proceeding from the Father through the Son ; and one holy Catholic Church, one baptism unto forgiveness of sins, one Eucharist, one fellowship of the faithful ; and in the life everlasting.'

It is important for us to put quite frankly the fact that a readjustment is coming, and must come if we wish Christianity to be intelligible to the world much longer. As a matter of fact, the restatement of the faith is well under way, but all too often those who are leading in the work are assailed as traitors by their brothers in the Church. There are, of course, limits to restatement ; there are times when it can become definite mis-statement. But in so far as the work is done loyally, with absolute fidelity to the fundamental beliefs in God, the divine-human Christ, the Holy Spirit and the Church, there is nothing to be feared.

We run risks when we begin to study modern thought and consider the adaptation of our faith to it. The work may be painful. Some things that we hold dear may vanish. But it is not a loss ; it is a great gain, since we shall see clearly the real basic truths of our faith, and no longer waste precious time on merely peripheral matters nor in the defence of alleged facts, once supposed true but actually false, which hamper our presentation of Christianity. Of one thing we may be sure. The fundamentals — the love of God, His supreme and saving Incarnation in Christ, the blessed company of all faithful people, the life everlasting — will never be lost. They stand sure whilst those things which are but temporary are shaken.

# IN MEMORIAM

## WILLIAM FARRER

ON November 15th the Modern Churchmen's Union lost a loyal member by the death of the Rev. Wm. Farrer, for many years Vicar of Bisham. He had been a notable oarsman at Eton and Balliol. He was a country parson of the best type, being as devoted to the country as to his parish. His ideal bishop was Wm. Boyd-Carpenter, whose prediction he was fond of citing:

> 'The religion of the future will be neither Protestant nor Catholic, but simply Christian.'

It seemed to Mr. Farrer, however, in his later years, that the Church of England was drifting hopelessly backward, and yet how needlessly.

The *Times* of November 29th contained a charming appreciation of him by two Eton friends, from which we make the following quotations:

> 'In interests and enthusiasms Farrer remained a boy all his life. It could be seen in his face, which kept to the last the rather noble look which is so often seen on boyish countenances until they go to their private school and become men of the world. Farrer never became a man of the world; he lived the quiet, uneventful life of a country parson, unambitious except for his friends, his school, and his college, and their successes he watched eagerly, for they were perhaps the most enduring interest in his life. He was greatly beloved by the Balliol men of his own time, and was a link between them and younger generations. It was characteristic that among the friends who gathered at Bisham last week, in token of their affection for him, there were Balliol men of all ages, from his own contemporaries to the present Captain of the Boat Club . . . '

> ' . . . Farrer had the wisdom of the simple-hearted, and refused to go on preaching sermons after he had said all he had to say. He retired while still able to get the full flavour of his leisure. Handsome, gentle, and amused, he lived out his life at Hurley, coaxing roses and birds to do what they do not care to do for most of us; and died young, as one beloved of the gods. His age was 84.'

H.D.A.M.

# BOOK REVIEWS

## A NEW CHRISTIAN YEAR*

It was the Greek poet Hesiod who coined the epigram: 'The Half is greater than the Whole,' and it is one that poets as well as preachers should never forget.

How much would Wordsworth's 'Excursion' have gained had he striven to make it as brief as his 'Ode to Immortality'; and had John Keble's Churchmanship permitted him to reduce the number of Sundays and Saints' days in the *Christian Year,* his cherished volume might have been even widely read to-day. To the younger generation of churchmen its contents are hardly known save for those extracts from it in our hymn books.

Plainly there is need for a new Christian year, and Mr. G. F. Bradby, a well-known Rugby master, and his friend the Archdeacon of Coventry, have sought to impart to us new lamps for old. This they have done, not by writing an original composition for each occasion, but following the counsel of the good Sir Roger de Coverley, who begged his clergyman not to write his own sermons but to read to his congregation, Sunday by Sunday, the compositions of the best English Divines, our authors, ranging through the spacious and varied fields of English poetry, have made a judicious and inspiring selection. Yet this statement is not entirely accurate. Fifteen selections have Mr. Bradby's initials appended. These selections, we are glad to see, include 'In Hoc Signo.'

> The Kingdoms of the Earth go by
> In purple and in gold:
> They rise, they triumph, and they die,
> And all their tale is told.
>
> One Kingdom only is divine,
> One banner triumphs still:
> Its King a servant, and its sign
> A gibbet on a hill.

There are also two very short poems which bear the initials of Archdeacon Hunkin. One of them, for the Second Sunday after Epiphany, seems to us a gem.

> 'Give us for wine the wine of youth,' men say,
> 'Drawn in the shining morning of our day.'
> But they who have the Master as their guest
> Drink at the last the best.

There are also seventeen anonymous selections. These are marked by extreme brevity, simplicity and practicality. All of them seem to us to have come from the same hand, but whose hand we are not able to recognize. One of them might have come from the pen of George Herbert or John Donne.

* *Through the Christian Year.* Arranged by G. F. Bradby and J. W. Hunkin. (S.C.M. 3/-. 1933.)

'Forgive us our trespasses':
When Thou hast pardon'd all I left undone,
And all the tale of things I did amiss,
Letting 'I would' be master of 'I ought,'
Lord, through the merits of Thine Own dear Son,
Our Saviour, in Thy pity grant me this—
Forgive me what I thought.

The authors in some cases fall short of the claim in their preface that they 'have tried to avoid including verses universally familiar.' For instance, their selections from Robert Browning hardly justify this claim; in the case of other authors they have been more successful. But such a self-denying ordinance is almost beyond the power of any, save the most stony-hearted of selectors, to observe, and we are very glad that they have failed in this respect. The poem of the dying Emily Brontë is included, as also Matthew Arnold's 'Calm Soul of All Things,' and Wordworth's 'The form remains, the function never dies.'

One of their most original selections and allocations is S. T. Coleridge's poem on 'an infant which died before Baptism,' assigned to Holy Innocent's Day.

'Be, rather than be call'd, a child of God,'
Death whispered!—with assenting nod,
Its head upon its mother's breast,
The baby bow'd, without demur—
Of the kingdom the blest
Possessor, not inheritor.

The attractive print and binding of this volume are appropriate to a book of poetry and devotion.

H.D.A.M.

## THE AGE OF GOOD SENSE*

Canon Creed and Mr. Boys Smith have collected together into a useful volume a number of typical passages from eighteenth century writers dealing with religious and philosophical matters. Their task was well worth performing, for although we have little to learn from the eighteenth century either in the way of facts or of ideas the history of the development of thought never ceases to be important. As our authors say in their scholarly Introduction, the century was characterised by 'a strong belief in the capacity of human faculties to understand and master the world,' supernatural sanctions had faded, and the authority of tradition had been set aside. 'The beginning of the eighteenth century may be said to mark the rise of a new type of civilization in which the autonomous reason claims the supreme power and dispossesses the older conceptions of Divine Right.'

Yet eighteenth century thinkers were not prepared to cut the painter altogether, they still respected the Christian tradition sufficiently to desire to call themselves by that name, but they aimed at purging their religion of all elements which seemed to them irrational. This attitude showed itself chiefly in a desire to simplify. On the one hand they wished to eliminate everything that savoured of superstition, while on the other hand they were suspicious of intellectual subtlety and of complex theological state-

* *Religious Thought in the Eighteenth Century*. By J. M. Creed and J. S. Boys Smith. (Cambridge University Press. 10/6.)

ments. They were convinced that the complexity of theology was due to the pedantry of theologians rather than to any natural complexity of subject-matter: and they regarded it as both unnecessary and undesirable. John Locke puts the point:

> 'The bulk of mankind have not leisure for Learning and Logic, and the superfine distinctions of the Schools. Where the hand is used to the Plough, and the Spade, the head is seldom elevated to sublime Notions, or exercised in mysterious reasonings. 'Tis well if men of that rank (to say nothing of the other Sex) can comprehend plain propositions, and a short reasoning about things familiar to their Minds, and nearly allied to their daily experience. Go beyond this and you amaze the greater part of mankind.'

Simplicity is an excellent thing, but one feels, sampling some of the arguments proffered in support of religion, that a virtue may be carried too far. For example, Dr. Samuel Clarke, a leading Low Church divine of the early Hanoverian period, argued as follows:

> 'He who believes in the *Being and Natural Attributes* of God, must of necessity (as has been shown in my former discourse) confess his *moral Attributes* also. Next, he who owns and has just notions of the moral Attributes of God, cannot avoid acknowledging the *Obligations of Morality and natural Religion.* In like manner, he who owns the Obligations of Morality and natural Religion, must needs, to support those obligations and make them effective in practise, believe in a *future State of Rewards and Punishments.* And finally, he who believes both the obligations of natural Religion; and the certainty of a future State of Rewards and Punishments; has no manner of reason left, why he should reject the *Christian Revelation,* when proposed to him in its original and genuine Simplicity.'

The reader, for whom belief was thus made such plain sailing, must have wondered how anyone could ever come to entertain doubts at all. And indeed the question was soon asked why if the principles of a rational and moral religion were so plain to the naked eye, any revelation should have been necessary to supplement them. Matthew Tyndal, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, published a volume entitled *Christianity as Old as the Creation, or the Gospel as a Republication of the Religion of Nature,* which was a clear and forcible statement of the Deistic position; the argument, while not directly attacking historical Christianity, tended to show that the idea of revelation was superfluous.

Inasmuch as revelation had, in accordance with tradition, been deemed to rest upon the twin pillars of Prophecy and Miracle, these elements of the divine dispensation became crucial topics for the divines and thinkers of the period. The credentials of revelation were examined by Thomas Sherlock in six sermons on *The Use and Abuse of Prophecy* preached in the Temple Church. Only extensive quotations would do justice to the subtlety of his argument, but the passage from the third discourse, here printed, shows how far biblical criticism has carried us since those days. With regard to Miracle we are glad to find included a passage from Conyers Middleton's *Free Inquiry,* wherein was discussed the question, much canvassed in Protestant circles, as to when miraculous powers had been withdrawn from the Church. The book, it will be remembered, had such an effect upon the immature mind of the future historian of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, that he declared himself a papist and had to be removed from the University of Oxford. The intelligent youth perceived

that Middleton's arguments proved either too much or too little, and he preferred the latter alternative, involving the corollary that miraculous powers had *never* been withdrawn, which is the papist position. Subsequently Gibbon turned the argument in the other direction and became an infidel. The famous passage upon Miracles from Hume's *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* wherein in thirty-two words he laid down a principle which libraries of confutation have failed to confute, is of course included here.

But Deism was exposed to more searching arguments at the hands of men like William Law, who laboured to expose the presumptuousness of those who placed complete reliance upon the unassisted human reason to probe the mysteries of existence :

> 'Their objection against revelation is founded upon the pretended sufficiency, and absolute perfection, of the light and strength of human reason, to teach all men all that is wise, and holy, and divine, in religion. But how do they prove this perfection of human reason? Do they appeal to mankind as proofs of this perfection? Do they produce any body of men, in this, or any other age of the world, that without any assistance from revelation have attained to this perfection of religious knowledge? This is not so much as pretended to.'

That a danger lurked in this type of apologetic was apparent to Joseph Butler. Human judgment may be incompetent, but he urges 'great Caution of not vilifying the Faculty of Reason, which is *the candle of the Lord within us'* (Prov. xx, 27). As Leslie Stephen observed, Butler's great claim upon our respect is his great moral earnestness. This enabled him to see more clearly than the optimists of the early eighteenth century the shortcomings of Nature itself, so that if Christianity be an offence, Nature is an offence also. He made it clear, as Höffding says, that 'it is just as possible to have an unthinking cult of Nature as an unthinking faith in Revelation.' Certainly the cocksureness of Deism was exposed by Butler. Our authors supply relevant quotations both from the *Analogy* and from the sermon 'Upon Humane Nature.'

We may be grateful to see printed in this volume Benjamin Hoadly's famous sermon on the text 'My Kingdom is not of this World,' preached before the King on March 31st, 1717, which applied the match to the train that fired the Bangorian Controversy. The sermon strikes at the heart of sacerdotalism by substantially denying the authority of the priest. Christ alone is King over His subjects. 'He is himself the sole lawgiver to His subjects, and Himself the sole judge of their behaviour, in the affairs of conscience and eternal salvation.'

The doctrine made Hoadly the best-hated bishop on the bench.

Indeed, these eighteenth century divines were at their best when dealing with some plain issue of ecclesiastical polity. Thus William Warburton on the blessings of the Establishment :

> 'Thus have we shown the mutual Privileges *given* and *received* by Church and State, in entering into this famous *Convention.* The Aim of the State being, agreeably to its Nature, *Utility* : And the Aim of the Church, agreeably to her's, *Truth.* From whence we may observe, that as these Privileges all took their Rise, by necessary Consequence from the fundamental Article of the Convention, which was, *that the Church should serve the State, and the State protect the Church* ; so they receive all possible Addition of Strength, from their mutual Dependency on one another.'

Canon Creed's and Mr. Boys Smith's excellent book, as we trust may have been made clear, is far more than an assemblage of quotations. It is a genuine guide to eighteenth century thought, and especially (though by no means exclusively) English thought in that period. The biographical sketches which introduce each new name supply all relevant facts, and the 40 page Introduction is admirable. In short we have here a fine piece of work, upon which authors and publishers are to be congratulated.

J. C. HARDWICK.

## THE UNITARIAN MOVEMENT*

Out of the dust and smoke of a recent controversy, which has obtained a greater publicity than perhaps its promoters either desired or deserved, two points would appear clearly to have emerged. In the first place many of our contemporaries have realized, probably for the first time, that there is still a body of thinkers and preachers who, under the name of Unitarians, have a definite contribution to make to current religious life and thought. Secondly, it is clear that the time has come for Liberal Christians of the Anglican community to seek a form of rapprochement with a distinguished body of men with whom they are officially out of communion. For these reasons alone Principal McLachlan's book deserves to be widely read.

He shows us how, in less propitious times, Liberal Christians were determined to uphold their right of private enquiry, and were able, despite religious and social ostracism, to maintain an exceedingly high standard of scholarship, education and culture. *The Unitarian Movement in the Religious Life of England* deals in detail with the period 1700-1900. It is divided into four sections dealing respectively with Biblical Scholarship, Education, Periodical Literature, and finally Doctrine, Philosophy and Belles Lettres. Of these the first and the last are of greater interest, for the incidentals and organization of educational institutions and periodicals are common to any movement which has its platform to set up, and later its public credit to maintain. The details of the denominational controversies centering round the formation of the newer universities are perhaps too faintly set out here; as an important factor in the history of English education they might be given fuller notice.

It is well to obtain, as here, glimpses of such men as Coleridge, Priestley, Martineau, and Estlin Carpenter, in their proper denominational setting. For although Unitarianism as such has made surprisingly little contribution to theological studies, it has a history in the history of its great men, the work of whom has successfully withstood both the test of time and the scrutiny of its would-be detractors.

Perhaps the one fault of Dr. MacLachlan's book is that, like an ill-balanced parish history which aspires to universal dissemination, it tells all too little of these *patres conscripti,* and is over-full of names which can mean nothing to the world at large. But their number has at least this use. It confirms the reader in his opinion that the doubts, difficulties, and aspirations which, a century ago, led men to set up a flourishing community outside the national Church, are not seldom the ones which induce them to-day to remain within her walls. For that reason alone it may be predicted that the pages of the nineteenth century will remain the roll of honour of names historic in Unitarianism. For though the fathers worshipped in no ignoble mountain, we say that in Jerusalem is where their sons ought to worship.

J. R. BATEMAN.

* *The Unitarian Movement in the Religious Life of England.* I. Its contribution to thought and learning, 1700—1900. By H. McLachlan, M.A., D.D., F.R.Hist.S. (London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1934. 10/6.)

## DR. BOUQUET'S HANDBOOKS*

These two books form Vols. V and VI in Dr. Bouquet's series of *Modern Handbooks on Religion* (of which the earlier volumes have previously been reviewed in the *Modern Churchman*). They are worthy members of that useful series, and Modern Churchmen ought to feel grateful for them, since they supply the need for an up-to-date presentation of religion in a form which the educated layman can understand and assimilate. It is not always easy for modernist parsons to find something which they can happily recommend to their 'enquiring laymen,' and Dr. Bouquet's 'Handbooks' meet a real need. Frank and outspoken, they face all difficulties and discuss both sides of a question fairly and honestly. Modernists will feel themselves at home in the atmosphere of intellectual honesty which pervades these books.

The first of the volumes now under consideration (*Man and Deity*) gives us an outline of the origin and development of religion, and forms an admirable introduction to a study of comparative religion. Theological students, as well as ordinary parsons and lay-folk, should profit greatly by it. The narrative is copiously illustrated by the provision of original texts translated from the sacred literature of the great religious systems of the world; this is a feature of the book which will be widely appreciated, since such texts are not usually accessible to the ordinary reader. A useful bibliography is also supplied. There are also several photographic illustrations which make the subject more real to the beginner. Dr. Bouquet shows how all over the world there is a movement towards 'standardisation,' in religion as in other matters, so that cultures and beliefs appear to be in a process of being welded into a federated system :—

> 'To that extent our age is transitional. Whatever form religious belief and practice may assume in ten thousand years' time, of this we may feel tolerably certain, that it will have passed beyond the phase of conflicting beliefs, and will have approached much nearer to the possession of a common mind. . . . Standing as we do betwixt the old and the new worlds, in an age in which the motor-lorry and the bullock wagon, the aeroplane and the dug-out canoe, antiseptic surgery and primitive witch-doctoring, modernist theology and primitive fetichism, classical and scientific studies still co-exist, we, it seems, are better fitted than the dwellers in an age which has banished for ever this co-existence of incongruous types, to determine prudently what kind of common belief in the mutual relations of Deity and humanity should govern the future of mankind' (p. 11).

In Vol. VI (*Jesus*) Dr. Bouquet gives us a new outline and estimate. It is a stimulating estimate of the significance of Jesus for modern thought and modern life, and it is couched in terms which modern folk can understand. But the book is much more than an outline of the life of Jesus, though a long chapter on 'The Historical Jesus' is included. Dr. Bouquet does not like *Formgeschichte* methods, and on the whole he follows Dr. Burkitt's 'Marcan' scheme. He says little about miracles in his outline, but adds significantly at the end of the chapter :—

> 'In this present account of the career of Jesus there has been little or no mention of "miracles," not because there is lack of evidence for

* *Man and Deity* and *Jesus: A New Outline and Estimate*. By the Rev. A. C. Bouquet, D.D., Stanton Lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion at Cambridge; Hulsean Lecturer, 1923-24. (Cr. 8vo, cloth. 7/6 and 6/- net respectively. Heffer, Cambridge. 1933.)

any such powers, but because loyalty to the Master Himself would seem to demand that they should not be stressed. To dwell on them would divert attention from the features of the story which are of real weight and permanent significance' (p. 115).

A useful Appendix on the Supernatural follows. After this comes a chapter on 'The Relation of Jesus to Deity,' in which the Church's formulations of orthodox Christological doctrine are explained and discussed. The discussion becomes a bit technical in places, but perhaps we ought not to be afraid of being somewhat technical on such a theme. Modernists will sympathise with the author's approach and probably with most of his conclusions—but is it, by the way, quite true to say that Paul of Samosata's Christology is really a 'reversion' to the Adoptianism of *Acts* and *Philippians* (*cf.* p. 142)? Dr. Bouquet's 'modernism' is sometimes very sweeping, as, for example, when he says (p. 235) that it is idle to discuss Pelagianism 'since all the ancient views as to the nature of man and the origin of sin were based on a pre-scientific view of the universe and the human race.'

There are chapters on 'The Alleged Infallibility of Jesus,' 'The Death of Jesus Christ,' 'The Finality of Christianity,' 'St. Paul,' 'The Church,' and (most interesting of all) 'The Future of Religion.' We can unhesitatingly commend the book to all modernists for its breadth of outlook, depth of thought and scholarship, honesty of purpose, frankness of expression and for the stimulating originality of its ideas. The argument is usually lucid, though the literary style lapses now and then in these Handbooks: there is a sentence of less than seven lines on the first page of Vol. V which contains five negatives!

ALAN RICHARDSON.

## ETHICAL PROBLEMS*

Under the title *Personal Ethics*, Dr. K. E. Kirk edits seven lectures delivered in the Queen's College Hall in the Michaelmas Term, 1933. The subjects are these: Education, Marriage, Patriotism, Social Inequalities, Earning and Spending, Gambling, Ethics and Religion. The editor states that there was no previous consultation among the lecturers concerning either method of treatment or results. In spite of that he considers that the method of approach in each lecture is similar, and that the same principles appear again and again. In particular, he calls attention to the agreement among the lecturers that circumstances are important in determining duties, that the circumstances must be known and appreciated, that social duties are also personal duties, and that we must act with a view to the future of the race.

All this is to the good. And there is no little ethical wisdom to be found in the pages of this small volume. Especially reasonable is Dr. Kirk's sympathetic criticism of what he calls the Romanticist's conception of marriage. He goes so far as to admit that 'in the matter of divorce it is conceivable, at least, that a compromise between the Romantic and the Christian tradition might be discovered which would not be unworkable.' Another very reasonable and temperately argued lecture is that on 'Gambling,' by Mr. R. C. Mortimer. He refuses to condemn all gambling as inherently wrong, but thinks that public gambling as it goes on at present

* *Personal Ethics.* By B. H. Streeter, K. E. Kirk, J. P. R. Maud, C. R. Morris, R. L. Hall, R. C. Mortimer, J. S. Bezzant. (The Clarendon Press. 1934. 5/-.)

ought to be sternly discouraged. He concludes: 'To the question, then, "May I buy a ticket in the Irish Sweep, or bet with a bookie on a race-course?" the answer would be, "In other circumstances you might, but things being as they are at present, you ought not."'

If one must criticise, I venture to express my feeling that some of these lectures are a little abstract—academic, indeed, as being the outcome of reflection on certain intellectual problems, rather than attempts to remedy actual disorders. For instance, Mr. C. R. Morris in his balanced discussion of 'Social Inequalities,' in which he makes several wise observations, does not allude to what some may regard as the crux—namely, the hereditary character of social classes. For the son of a labourer, unless exceptionally brilliant and capable, usually becomes a labourer, or at most an artisan or the like, whereas the son of a professional man, unless very stupid or dissolute, usually becomes a professional man or earns his living by some occupation of about the same standard in public esteem and remuneration, the distinction being maintained by the costliness of the education fitting for the 'superior' occupations and social status. Again, Mr. R. L. Hall, dealing with 'Earning and Spending,' gives an admirable apologia for what he describes as a *laisser faire* system of production and exchange, 'modified by the activities of state and private organizations'; but he does not seriously tackle the question of personal expenditure—namely, how anyone with more than the average income ought to spend it, on the principle of absolute unselfishness, or of counting the welfare of anyone else in the community or in the human race as, *caeteris paribus*, of equal importance with his own.

The concluding lecture, on 'Ethics and Religion,' by Canon J. S. Bezzant, is marked by philosophical breadth and learning; but I think the conclusions might be more lucidly and arrestingly stated. He rightly contends for the autonomy of the moral law and its independence of religion. He is also right in asserting that materialistic naturalism tends to take the heart out of morality, whereas Christian theism supports it. Morality, therefore, appears to be both independent of and dependent on religion. This, I suggest, is because moral laws and virtues, such as truthfulness, honesty, charity, control of the appetites, are obviously essential to ordinary human life, which we naturally take to be on the whole worth living; but if life be the transitory phenomenon which is all that the materialistic or even merely humanistic hypothesis can allow it to be, then both human life and the virtues essential to it are apt to seem of dubious worth. On the other hand, a theistic hypothesis, especially one, such as the Christian, which represents the Deity as greatly concerned about the human race and its members, so much as to desire to make them participators in His own life, not only endorses the recognised moral laws and virtues as essential to ordinary human life, but immensely exalts them as essential to man's attainment of heavenly and eternal life. For this reason, as Mr. Bezzant well remarks, 'the reverence and love of God—as the love of a Person whose rule of love is the only ultimate power there is, and who is the source and spring of conscience itself no less than of all goodness—is the one emotional influence, whether of a personal or social kind, which will assuredly always support and intensify the demands of morality.' But why only 'emotional,' and not 'rational' also?

F. A. M. Spencer.

## ROMAN CATHOLIC MODERNISM—ITS RISE & DECLINE*

It is often overlooked in discussions upon Modernism that the term itself is the name of a definite movement which had its origins and outcome within the Church of Rome. Sponsored up to a point by Pope Leo XIII, it was condemned by his successor, Pius X, in his encyclical, *Pascendi Gregis*, and its condemnation demonstrated the impracticability of a liberal movement within the most traditional of the churches of Christendom. In spite of the fact that the Roman Church has been known to introduce novelties of doctrine as occasion has demanded, yet its whole approach to theology rests ultimately upon a view of religion as based upon dogma. The keynote of the teaching of Fr. Tyrrell was an appeal for a religion which might find its sanction in life and experience. The two are in reality incompatible and there could be but little doubt of the final outcome of the movement, a bitter story of disillusionment and of excommunication.

For long there had been a feeling in certain quarters for a liberal Catholicism; the struggle between Gallican and Ultramontane had its roots in this demand. In England, so far as the Roman Church was concerned, the school of W. G. Ward and of Manning triumphed over and crushed out that of Newman solely because it was felt that the postulates of Newman's teaching tended in a liberal direction. Arthur Galton, who left the Roman Church in disillusion, has told of the remarkable liturgical differences which he was to find in the diocese of Ullathorne after knowing that of Manning. On the one hand, there was a determination to bring Catholicism under the sway of Papalism, on the other, there was an attempt to secure a Catholicism at once orthodox and democratic. The French Gallicans had suffered severely from the Napoleonic concordat. To America belongs the strange story of Fr. Hecker and the movement known as 'Americanism'; Italy had seen the beginnings of a liberal movement. The Papal decision upon the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in 1854 and the decisions of the Vatican Council in 1870 were severe blows to those who were seeking to break down the Ultramontane centralization of religion in the Vatican, but they were blows which summoned to fresh endeavour rather than crushing defeats. It was felt by many that Philosophical scholasticism was breaking down, that current thought demanded a re-adjustment in the realm of theological speculation, and the ground was well prepared for the movement known as 'Modernism.' Manning had conquered over Newman, W. G. Ward and *The Dublin Review* were preaching the gospel of Vaticanism, but the liberals, especially in France, prepared battle. The initial cause of the movement was at hand in Biblical Criticism, its first centre was the Institut Catholique of Paris, and its most notable characters Duchesne and Loisy.

It was Duchesne who first sponsored Loisy, failing doubtless to see the result which Biblical Criticism would have upon dogma. Later he drew back and advised others to do so. Loisy, as a young lecturer on the Old Testament, was already coming under the great and persuasive influence of Ernest Renan. It was an age when Renan was at the height of his fame, and young France was following his call as that of a great leader. His brilliant pen had earned him a European reputation. It was he who introduced Loisy to the scientific method and thus helped him to his more detailed work. Book followed book from Loisy's pen. The French Catholics were astounded at being introduced by a priest of the church to the more

* *The Modernist Movement in the Roman Church.* By A. R. Vidler, pp. xiii + 286 (Cambridge University Press. 1934. 12/6.)

radical Old Testament criticism. He came forward as the champion of Catholicism against the Liberal Protestant Harnack, but his defence of his church was secured at a great cost to the traditionalist position. That he tried to be a Catholic when he had ceased to be a Christian was the reproach made against Loisy, not by any ultramontane cardinal, but by the future Dean of St. Paul's, although a measure of support against Dr. Inge was forthcoming from Dr. T. A. Lacey and the Rev. A. L. Lilley, a notable exponent of Modernism in the Church of England. Excommunication was now very near. Explanations were attempted, high dignitaries were interviewed, but it was in vain. Loisy's writings made impossible any healing of the wounds which he had caused, and in 1908 he was excommunicated. Since then his work has been that of a lay professor, dissenting from all religious creeds, and of recent years he has achieved fame as an exponent of somewhat radical views in the realm of New Testament scholarship, where he has put forward a view of Christian origins as having their roots in messianic and eschatological legend. His original defence of Catholicism was based upon an extremely subjectivist attitude. Yet, in the realm of pure scholarship, Loisy has done much to correct the ultra-individualist tendency of much Liberal Protestantism which had led to the reading back of nineteenth century notions into the records. It is not too much to say that, however much he may have disclaimed a connection with the movement, Duchesne never abandoned the scientific method which, in early days, he had learned from Loisy, whilst French Modernism was also enriched by the name of Alfred Houtin, whose work too little known in this country, did much to elucidate the legends of the Gallic saints.

England was the home of the Baron von Hügel, 'the lay-pope' of the movement, and his influence was widespread outside his own communion. The friend of Loisy, it was he who encouraged the young Irish Jesuit George Tyrrell, to study German and to explore the latest theological literature. Tyrrell, a truly devout soul and perhaps the most delightful character in the movement, was a convert on fire with his love of Catholicism and pained by the gap which he saw between the church of his adoption and modern culture. He flung himself into the task of working out a modern apologetic which should lack the scholastic note and which should represent a Catholicism truly democratic and free. He found his philosophical justification in pragmatism, and it was upon these lines that he produced his *Letter to a Professor*, later re-issued as the *Much-Abused Letter*. Expulsion from the Jesuit order followed. Work as a secular priest proved hopeless, but Tyrrell refused to leave the church which, with all its faults, he loved still. It was he who criticized the encyclical of 1908 in *The Times*, and excommunication came as a matter of course. He had thrown himself against authority, as that term is understood in the Roman Church, and he killed himself in the task. Death, which came early and suddenly, carried Fr. Tyrrell to that realm where all things are reconciled, and his battles were at an end. Yet his influence was wide and, to some extent, has proved enduring. Many an Anglo-Catholic, harassed by doubt, yet breathing a freer air than that of Rome, has turned to Tyrrell for guidance and help. His last book was heavily indebted to Schweitzer for its Christology, a fact which does not aid it as a piece of scholarship but this is incidental to his main case, the claiming of an intellectual value for a democratic Catholicism which should be at one with modern thought. His conception of the development of doctrine was based upon a Darwinian view of evolution, a very different idea to that of Newman, who saw in the

evelopment merely the unrolling of a scroll previously written; yet it is ot too much to urge that Tyrrell could find much justification in the ritings of Newman. One friend of Tyrrell's must be mentioned. Alfred awkes, the convert priest, turned back from the church of his adoption to hat of his baptism. In many ways, he was the most distinguished exonent of Modernist ideals to English readers. In Tyrrell and Fawkes these eals have more distinctly national characteristics than they do when pounded by the continental Modernists. Tyrrell was essentially a great manist. He was pained by the sufferings of humanity upon its intellecal side, and his life was one long struggle to alleviate those sufferings.

Philosophically, where it was not purely pragmatist, Modernism was rgely inspired by the French activist philosophers, and on the Biblical estions it owed most to Loisy. This is seen in Italy, where Muin, following these guides, made it into a social gospel, as did Fogazzaro in his vel, *Il Santo*.

We congratulate Mr. Vidler upon his book. He has given us what has ng been needed, a complete history of a movement which the Roman hurch spurned and killed, turning out its leaders without compunction, t which has had a far-reaching effect upon modern liberal theology. rofessor Percy Gardner, Miss Petre, Alfred Fawkes, and Rev. A. L. lley, have written studies of the movement which are still necessary and luable to the student, but Mr. Vidler has brought the whole story within e covers of one book. We trust that he will find many readers for his tractively-produced volume. He has told his story in a manner both able d interesting, and has helped to make known to English readers the work many Continental scholars. His labours will have been abundantly stified if he succeeds in sending more readers to the works of the French odernists. They deserve to be better known, for in them is a wealth of holarship which is not easily found elsewhere. An example is the research on the origins of the French dioceses.

Modernism is now a dead movement in the Roman Church and, when e place which that church occupies in contemporary intellectual society recalled, we cannot offer to it our congratulations upon the results of e ultramontane triumph. With Dr. Inge, we may dislike the critical tlook of certain Modernist leaders, but the fact remains that the movent proved once and for all that Catholicism, as the term is generally ough loosely understood, is not the property of the static religionists. is a wide *ethos* and, as Dr. T. A. Lacey remarked, the real schism is to rrow the boundaries. The Catholic tradition is the heritage of Modern-s, and its many values are available for their use. Paul Sabatier empted to spread Modernism in France solely because he saw that this true, and it is the spread of this point of view outside the Roman Church ich has proved a useful corrective to the philosophical weakness of the er forms of Liberal Protestantism. It is not to despise the school of anley and of Jowett to suggest that it may be enriched by certain values wn from Catholic tradition, and that Tyrrell has shown another side to ological liberalism. On the contrary, it tends to expand and aid the er school. Again, the Modernist Movement has done much to liberate glo-Catholicism, where it is willing to be liberated, from the shackles an enervating traditionalism. It was a small body of Cambridge graduos of High Church views, whose number included the names of Mr. ens and of the present Master of the Temple, who sent a message of npathy to Fr. Tyrrell. The influence of the Baron von Hügel in the urch of England is too well known to need further comment. If Anglo-

Catholicism is a broader and a better thing to-day than it was in the days of Dr. Pusey or even of *Lux Mundi*, it is because many who are accounted honoured leaders have drunk of the stream of the Modernist tradition. It is because we believe that the outlook occasioned by the Roman Modernists has a far-reaching value in the solution of present-day religious problems that we would desire all who are attempting the achievement of this end to read Mr. Vidler's book. Their interest will sustain them beyond the last chapter into the older histories of the Movement and much of its literature.

F. H. AMPHLETT MICKLEWRIGHT.

## THE EUCHARIST AND DAILY LIFE*

Manuals of meditation and devotion in connection with the Service of Holy Communion are numerous and varied, and yet there are few which may be commended without reserve. Some are over-loaded with a mass of detailed instruction and advice, some force the emotional note unduly, while many are permeated by an atmosphere of hot-house piety. Of such faults there is no trace in Mr. Kenneth Ingram's little volume of meditations on the different sections of the Service of Holy Communion. Its author thus describes his purpose and method :—

> 'This is a book of personal reflections. I offer it because it is possible that someone may discover an affinity between his own ideas and the notions which I have jotted down. It is just possible that some who are quite alien to my particular religious professions may also discover an affinity. For the distinctive note of this skeleton meditation is its secularity. The secularity is a deliberate note. When I enter into the holy of holies I do not want to leave my world behind me; I do not believe that I ought to do so.'

The book is written in an attractive style and is marked by a happy blend of sincere thinking and deep feeling.

It is with real gratitude that we welcome Mr. Luce's Communion Manual. It contains the Service of Holy Communion along with devotional helps and a few explanatory notes. For some years, in our preparation of Confirmation candidates, we have used his hand-book *A Modern Confirmation Manual*. It is sane, sincere, and the work of one who is a skilled teacher, and we have found it invaluable. In his Communion Manual he has now provided just the right book for presentation after Confirmation to young people who have been prepared along the lines of his earlier book. It is not over-loaded with matter; but it says exactly what needs to be said, and says it simply and convincingly. It is worthy of attention by those who bemoan the presence among our young people of so many lapsed Communicants. If its use were general we believe that their number would be sensibly diminished.

G. L. H. HARVEY.

* *A Lay Devotion.* By Kenneth Ingram. (Published 1934 by Messrs. Philip and Co. Price 1/6 net.)

* *Lift up Your Hearts.* A Modern Communion Manual. By the Rev. H. K. Luce, M.A., B.D. (Published 1934 by Messrs. A. and C. Black, Ltd. Price 2/6 net, or with Epistles, Collects and Gospels, 3/6 net.)